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THE EFFECT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING PROGRAMMES ON LONG-TERM 
GOVERNMENT BONDS 
Teresa Gaspar Silva 
 
Abstract: The aim of this dissertation is to clarify the Quantitative Easing programmes 
employed by the United States of America, United Kingdom, Euro Area and Japan 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and assess its impact into the variation of the 
long-term Government bond yield, using monthly and quarterly based data. The 
empirical analysis consisted in four equations for each timeframe using an OLS 
estimator. It was found evidence supporting that QE diminishes the variation of the 
long-term Government bond yield in the US. On the UK case, it was found evidence 
that QE measures reduces the explained variable but with modest strength. In the EA 
and in Japan the results were ambiguous and one cannot be assertive about the impact of 
QE policies for both economies.  
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GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS 
Teresa Gaspar Silva 
 
Resumo: O objectivo desta dissertação é apresentar os programas de Quantitative 
Easing levados a cabo nos Estados Unidos da América, Reino Unido, Zona Euro e no 
Japão durante a Crise Financeira de 2007-2009 e avaliar o seu impacto na variação das 
taxas de juro de longo prazo para títulos do Governo, usando dados mensais e 
trimestrais. A analise empírica consistiu em quatro equações para cada frequência 
temporal usando um estimador OLS. No caso dos USA, foi encontrado suporte de que 
as politicas de QE diminuem a taxa de juro de longo prazo para títulos do Governo. A 
mesma relação foi encontrada para o Reino Unido, no entanto com menos assertividade. 
Os resultados para a Zona Euro e para o Japão foram ambíguos e não foi possível 
determinar o impacto das medidas de QE para estes países. 
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On September 2009, the Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy marking the 
beginning of what became the “Great Recession”. After this episode, the financial 
markets became dysfunctional, credit conditions constricted, consumption and 
investment decreased and overall, the economic indicators deteriorated. Aiming for a 
recovery of consumption and the economy in general, Central Banks opted to loosen 
their monetary policy. One of the first actions taken was the decrease of the 
instrumental rate. The interest rates approached levels close to zero (Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB) theory) and financial markets remained dysfunctional. At this point, the 
conventional monetary policy was worn out so the Central Bank needed a new action 
plan – the so-called unconventional monetary policies. There are several ways of 
implementing unconventional monetary policies; this study focuses on the Quantitative 
Easing measures. Quantitative Easing (QE) is a mechanism where the Central Bank 
creates new money (electronically) and employs the increasing of monetary base on 
financial asset purchases, such as government bonds. Before the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2009, QE related research was not abundant. After 2008, the amount of studies 
about the effects of QE skyrocketed.  Regarding the US, Gagnon et al. (2011), Chung et 
al. (2010) and Baumeister and Benati (2010) represent the most cited studies about the 
effect of QE measures in the American economy. Joyce et al. (2011) and Joyce, Tong 
and Woods (2011) are relevant essays about the QE programmes lead by the Bank of 
England (BOE). Some literature on the European case was performed by Attinasi et al. 
(2009), Gambacorta et al. (2012) and Afonso and Kazemi (2017). The new wave of 
Japanese QE policies was studied by Rogers et al. (2014) and Gambacorta et al. (2012). 
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Fawley and Neely (2013), Rogers et al. (2014) and Gambacorta et al. (2012) are 
rare examples of studies that portray and compare the four major QE programmes. 
Most of the empirical analysis on the topic uses high-frequency financial data and 
does not include more than one or two economies. Therefore, there is a lack of literature 
that describes and compares QE programmes, across Central Banks, especially with 
theoretical and empirical analysis of its own. 
Inspired by the gap on the literature, the aim of this dissertation is to assess the 
motivations the lead the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Bank of England (BOE), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to consider the use of QE; 
to portray the peculiarities of each economy and programme and, finally, assess the 
impact of the announcement and asset purchases under QE policies into the long-term 
Government bond yield. 
The thesis is organized as follows: the following section presents an overview on 
the relevant literature; section three presents the path through conventional monetary 
policy to unconventional monetary policy, in particular Quantitative Easing measures; 
section four describes the model, the data used and the methodology employed for each 
economy; section five reports the outputs of the empirical analysis and discussion; the 
conclusion and further research is on section six. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on evaluating the impacts of the quantitative easing (QE) 
programmes has usually obtained its results using high-frequency data. Event-studies 
and structural vector autoregression (VAR) models are the most used approaches in 
assessing the impact of unconventional monetary policy. It is worth mentioning the 
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scarcity of studies evaluating the programmes of the United States of America (US), 
United Kingdom (UK), Euro area (EA) and Japan (JP) with an empirical analysis on 
their own, and even less studies employing monthly or quarterly data, in order to assess 
the long-term outcomes of those programmes. 
Fawley and Neely (2013) portray the circumstances and motivations that led the 
Fed (Federal Reserve System of the US), European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of 
England (BOE) and Bank of Japan (BOJ) to implement QE programmes. A list of the 
most important announcements made in the scope of QE and a timeline of its purchases 
is provided. Was concluded that not all QE programmes were implemented with the 
same goal or tools. The Fed and the BOE chose to expand their monetary bases by 
purchasing bonds while the ECB and BOJ opted to focus on direct lending to banks. 
The different type of economy of the countries justifies these differences. The paper 
presents a valuable conjectural resume of the four major QE programmes using 
available empirical investigation of the most remarkable literature.  
Gambacorta et al. (2012) aimed to measure the effectiveness of unconventional 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound in eight countries, including Canada, Japan, 
US and Norway. Using panel VAR with monthly data from 2008 to 2011, it was 
concluded that the exogenous rise in Central Bank (CB) balance sheets at the zero lower 
bound leads to a momentary increase in economic activity and consumer prices; in 
consequence the estimated output effects were qualitatively comparable to the ones 
found in the literature on the effects of conventional monetary policy, while the impact 
on the price level is weaker and less persistent; the unconventional measures had a 
similar macroeconomic effect across countries. Last but not least, the authors assessed 
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that is needed an immense expansion of the CB’s balance sheet to achieve a strong 
monetary stimulus. 
Rogers et al. (2014) used common methodologies in order to report the outcomes of 
unconventional monetary policy on stock prices, bond yields and exchange rates for the 
BOE, Fed, ECB and BOJ. The methodology used was an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator with intraday data and a structural VAR model with daily data. The research 
concluded that the policies applied were effective, even in the zero lower bound 
scenarios, improving broad financial conditions. These policies worked mainly through 
the reduction of the term premia. They observed spill over effects between countries 
although it was not in the same magnitude for all economies. The authors did not only 
found good news, the influence of bond yields into assets prices appeared to have a 
higher effect on the US than in other economies and with the recovery that will be 
needed after the end of unconventional monetary policies it is likely that the long-term 
yields will increase. 
Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011) evaluate the motivation of the large-scale asset 
programmes held by the Bank of England and portray how it was executed. The aim is 
to verify the impact of the asset purchases that began in 2009 had on the economy, 
specifically in the financial markets. Thus, this paper contributes with a synopsis about 
the design, operation and impact of the quantitative easing programme of the United 
Kingdom. The authors emphasise that the scale and speed of the asset purchases 
indicate that they were made with the intention of reversing the fall in confidence and 
the risk of rise of inflation falling sharply below target. The architecture of the 
programme was intended to target purchases of medium to long-term gilts from the non-
bank financial sector. The impact was obvious on asset prices. Moreover, it was 
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analysed a variety of approaches used by the BOE’s research to quantify the possible 
influence of those asset price variances on output and inflation. Although there is no 
certainty about the exact magnitude of the impact, the evidence suggests that the policy 
had positive and significant economic effects. 
On the same note, Joyce et al. (2011) portray the unconventional monetary 
measures that the BOE adopted to battle the financial crisis. The study analysed the key 
transmission channels that affect the financial markets. For this, it was used an event-
study analysis and survey data. The authors scrutinize the instantaneous response of 
asset prices to QE announcements and assign it into separated channels. The assets 
studied were the gilts, corporate bonds, equities and the Sterling. The majority of the 
impact of QE on gilt yields happens when the purchases are announced and not when 
the purchases truly happen. The main results of this study indicate that the QE 
purchases programs had a noteworthy effect on financial markets and predominantly on 
gilt yields. 
The main goal of Baumeister and Benati (2010) was to analyse the 
macroeconomics consequences of a reduction in the long-term bond yield spread when 
the short-term interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound within the Great 
Recession (2007-2009) timeframe in US and UK. Their research is guided by two main 
questions: first, how effective CBs’ unconventional monetary policy actions in the form 
of government-bonds purchases were in counteracting the recessionary shocks of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis; and secondly, how powerful central bank interventions are 
during the zero lower bound. To answer this question, the article proposes the creation 
of a counterfactual recreation of how output, inflation and unemployment would have 
developed if the asset purchases programs did not take place. The research concluded 
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that a reduction in the long-term yield spread employs a prevailing effect on both 
inflation and output when in a zero lower bound situation, as in the case of the US and 
the UK. 
The focus of Driffill (2016) was the unconventional monetary policy in the Euro 
zone but it also debates the policies implemented by the Fed and the BOE. The 
objective was to provide lessons to the Euro area using the information available about 
the other two programmes. It was noted that, in comparison with the programmes held 
by the Fed and the BOE, the ECB’s programme had a much smaller effect on bond 
yields and thus the effects on output and inflation could be less puissant. The good news 
are that the most common dangers of QE, i.e. the creation of asset prices bubbles, 
allowing zombie firms and banks to survive, higher levels of future inflation and the 
deceleration of the adjustment processes, do not appear to be a concern for EA. The 
ECB’s efforts seemed to contribute on the reduction of costs of debt service that could 
ease the fiscal situation of member states. 
The main contribution for the literature about QE given by Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) was the enlightenment about how different transmissions 
channels for QE1 in 2008–2009 and QE2 in 2010–2011 led by the Fed influenced the 
interest rates and their implications in policymaking. The methodology chosen consists 
in an event-study using intraday data, which allowed the authors to distinguish the 
various transmissions channels. The methodology used consists in a difference-in-
differences approach. The signalling effect, long-term safety channel and the inflation 
channel were the primary transmissions channels that influenced both QE1 and QE2. 
The channels that were only relevant during QE1 were the Mortgage-backed Securities 
(MBS) risk premium, default risk premium and the liquidity channel. Based on these 
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results three main policy implications were derived: it is not appropriate that the 
spotlight of CBs’ policy rate to be the Treasury rate; QE has a higher benign effect on 
mortgage and lower-grade corporate rates whenever the Federal Reserve’s asset 
purchases include non-Treasury assets; and as a Treasury-only policy, such as QE2, is 
transmitted mainly by a signalling channel, it will make the markets lower the 
expectation level of future federal funds rates. 
Gagnon et al. (2011) clarifies how the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases 
(LSAP) were employed and debates the mechanisms through which the asset purchases 
could affect the economy. The authors quickly examined the experiences of Japan and 
the UK to compare the results. To assess the effect of LSAP on market interest rates two 
different approaches were used: an event-study and a time-series analysis. The event-
study analysis consisted in the study of eight major announcements using a one-day 
window frame and it was possible to observe that all interest rates suffered a significant 
decrease. The event-study and the time-series analysis came to the same conclusions, 
even using different information in the tests. It was found that the market functioning 
effect was stronger at the beginning of the LSAP and the portfolio balance effect was 
probably responsible for the long-term effects; and that the LSAP resulted in long-
lasting reductions in the long-run interest rates on a diverse range of securities even 
those that were not part of the purchases, indicating a spillover effect. 
Wright (2012) opted for a high-frequency event-study and a structural VAR within 
the period of November 2008 to December 2010, using daily data, in order to measure 
the impact of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings and 
announcements related to monetary policy on several long-term interest rates for the 
US. The conclusions of this work were: monetary policy shocks affect long-run 
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Treasury and Corporate bonds but its effect fades quite fast, in a period of about two 
months; and the impact of monetary policy shocks were stronger in longer-term interest 
rates than in short-term interest rates. 
Chung et al. (2010) incorporated expectations on the modelling of the impact on 
macroeconomic variables made by the LSAPs using a forecasting model used by the 
Federal Reserve Board, from 2009 to 2016. The model made it possible to observe an 
improvement of real economy conditions that were led by changes in financial 
conditions, such as lower foreign exchange value of the dollar and higher stock market 
valuations; LSAPs led to an increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), lower 
unemployment rate and also contributed on price stability, as long-term inflationary 
consequences of the programme were not a likely scenario anymore. Overall, the study 
reflects that agents have confidence in the FOMC’s actions. 
Attinasi et al. (2009) aim was to discover the determinants of the increase in the 
sovereign bond yield spread of selected EA countries vis-à-vis Germany. It was done 
via a dynamic panel regression containing data from several European countries 
between July 2007 and March 2009. It was observed that announcements of bank rescue 
packages steered a revision of sovereign credit risk by the investors; and when 
comparing to Germany, countries with greater expected budget deficits or/and greater 
government debt ratios had higher government bond yields spreads. 
De Grauwe and Ji (2014) scrutinized the changes in Eurozone spreads. The focuses 
were on outlining how much of the downturn is merited to improving fundamentals and 
determining how much could be attributed to optimistic market sentiments sparked by 
the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in the third quarter of 
2012. After analysing nine countries of the EA between the first quarter of 2000 and the 
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third quarter of 2013, the following conclusions derives: throughout 2010-2012 
periphery countries suffered an increase in their spread that could not be justified by 
changes in the fundamentals, such as debt-to-GDP ratio, but by negative market 
sentiments; after the third quarter of 2012 the spreads of periphery countries have 
declined and, as before, this occurrence could not be attributed to changes in 
fundamentals but with the improvement of market sentiments, which coincide exactly 
with the OMT announcement by the ECB. Thus, market sentiments are not always in 
line with the fundamentals what could prevent the market from considering the actuals 
risks. 
Studying the relation between banking and sovereign risk in the Euro area was the 
proposition of Gerlach et al. (2010). In order to do so, the authors questioned what 
factors have been influencing the spread in the Euro zone after the introduction of the 
Euro, focusing on the banking sector and sovereign risk. Employing a dynamic panel 
model with data from nine euro area countries between 1999 and 2009, it was observed 
that sovereign spreads diminish with bigger equity ratios; the size of the banking sector, 
proxy by aggregate balance sheet to GDP ratio, was an essential factor of sovereign risk 
spread relative to Germany in the Euro area; if and when readings of aggregate risk 
raised, yields increased more rapidly in economies with large banking sectors but the 
rising in aggregate risk was in itself increasing banking risk. Thus, variations of global 
risk perception could affect, in size and speed, sovereign risk spreads. 
Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) incorporated literature previously mentioned, 
Attinasi et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010), on their work about “How the Financial 
Crisis has Helped Investors to Rediscover Risk” - an analysis of yields spreads on 
European Monetary Union (EMU) government bonds from 2000 to 2010. The authors 
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used a dynamic panel regression. They observed that spreads converged with the 
introduction of the Euro and abruptly diverged with the financial crisis of 2007. It is 
important to note that before the crisis, some spreads’ determinants were being ignored 
by the investors and after the crisis investors gave more attention to countries’ credit 
risk. Therefore, risk aversion in the markets became more important. Consequently, 
during the crisis, the fundamentals turn out to be more important for investors leading to 
an increase in spreads. As also concluded by Gerlach et al. (2010), sovereign risk is 
manipulated by equity ratios of banks. At last, the authors additionally concluded that 
high forecast debt levels have a higher impact on yield spreads than the expected GDP 
growth rates. 
 Fawley and Neely (2013), Gambacorta et al. (2012) and Rogers et al. (2014) 
scrutinize and compare various programmes of unconventional monetary policy. The 
first study states that purchase of bonds were the main tools used by the Fed and the 
BOE, while the BOJ and ECB focus on direct lending to banks. Gambacorta et al. 
(2012) found evidence that the macroeconomic effects were similar among countries 
and that an immense expansion of the CB’s balance sheet was needed to achieve a 
strong monetary stimulus. Rogers et al. (2014) observe a higher effect on the US 
economy than in the others studied and Driffill (2016) argued that the policies of the 
Fed and the BOE were more effective than the policies of the ECB.   
 Gagnon et al. (2011) and Wright (2012) agree that QE measures have a greater 
impact on long-term interest rates comparing with short-term rates.  
 De Grauwe and Ji (2014) and Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) noticed that 
fundamentals and spread determinants were being ignored before the financial crises. 
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 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011) and Chung 
et al. (2010) stressed the importance of the confident on the monetary authorities when 
employing unconventional monetary policies. In the same line of thought, Joyce et al. 
(2011) concluded that most of the impact on gilts by the QE programmes were at the 
time of the announcements rather than at the time of the actual purchases.   
The entire literature mentioned above is summarized in Table I with results and 
specific details regarding the methodology and the sample size. 
3. The Path from Conventional Monetary Policy to 
Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Central banks are one of the key agents in every economy. They are responsible for 
the currency/monetary issuance, supervision of the monetary system and definition and 
conduction of monetary policy. Different CBs have distinct mandates and so the goal of 
their monetary policy will be different from one another. In general, the goals of 
monetary policy (MP) can be price stability, high employment, economic growth, 
financial market stability, interest rate stability and foreign exchange market stability.  
Thus, monetary policy provides ample monetary stimulus to the economy during 
downturns offers inflationary tension during upturns and eases the sound functioning of 
money markets. 
Although the CB sets the goals for the monetary policy, it is unable to influence it 
directly. Hence, CBs use their MP tools to manipulate operating targets (such as: 
banking liquidity, monetary market interest rates) and those targets will influence 
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intermediate targets. These mechanisms will act through transmission channels and will 
manipulate the final goals of the monetary policy. (Abreu et al., 2012) 
The usual action of the CBs is setting target for the overnight interest rate in the 
interbank money market by adjusting the money supply through open market 
operations. (Smaghi, 2009) By doing so, the central bank is not involved in direct 
lending to the Government or the private sector. Therefore, the risk of exposure of the 
CB’s balance sheet is lessened; the fact that all the transactions that are made to provide 
liquidity are reverse transactions against a list of eligible collateral also contributes to 
the low risk incurred in the process. (Smaghi, 2009) As such, CBs conduct the liquidity 
conditions in the money markets and work on its mandate objectives, piloting key 
interest rates. (Smaghi, 2009)  
Standard and non-standard policies affect the economy through several main 
transmission channels. The topic will be resumed later through this chapter. 
Tension started to build up on American financial markets at the beginning of 2007. 
In 2008, financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest investment 
banks in the world, go bankrupt. As a result, the transmission mechanics of monetary 
policy stopped working properly as the general risk level went up, resulting in liquidity 
sinking. Capital flows between countries went to minimum records and the financial 
crisis rapidly disseminated to Europe and emerging economies. 
When the economy suffers a powerful shock the interest rate may be brought to 
zero or the transmission process of MP may no longer work, even when interest rate 
different from zero (Smaghi, 2009).1 
                                                 
1 Keynes coined the term Liquidity Trap in 1936 in order to define a situation where the short-term 
nominal interest rate is, or really close to, zero, also known as the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
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When faced with a scenario where traditional tools are no longer effective, as it 
happened in the financial crisis of 2007, the policy-makers are challenged with a 
number of questions. Monetary policy-makers should visibly delineate the objectives of 
the unconventional measures and then pick the best measures to pursue those objectives. 
They should also be aware of the possible side effects of those policies, such as the 
influence on the financial soundness of the CB’s balance sheet and avoiding the 
blockage of market recovery to normal functioning with unconventional measures. 
(Smaghi, 2009) 
Unconventional monetary policies consist in actions that directly aim the 
accessibility and cost of external finance to banks, non-financial companies and 
households. These policies can be funded by CB liquidity, loans, fixed-income 
securities and equity. (Smaghi, 2009) 
The type of shock, the state of the banking system and the differences on 
institutional peculiarities influence the selection of tools used by the CBs to endure with 
the atypical scenario in interbank markets and economy in general. (Smaghi, 2009)  
In the US, the need for unconventional monetary policy arrived when the economy 
faced a ZLB situation and the normal status quo was no longer effective. In this case, 
the unconventional monetary policy substituted the conventional monetary policy. 
In the EA, the unconventional monetary policy ensured the transmission of 
monetary policy in the face of financial market malfunctioning, as a complement of the 
conventional policies. In the case of ZLB, the CB may decide to influence medium to 
long-term interest rate expectations, change the composition and/or expand of the CB’s 
balance sheet. When a transmission tool is not working, the CB may bring the short-
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term nominal interest rates to zero and step in precisely on the transmission mechanism 
causing problems using unconventional policies.  
Bernanke et al. (2004) found evidence supporting that different financial assets are 
not perfect substitutes, making variations in the composition of the CB’s balance sheet 
an effective unconventional monetary policy. 
Communication and credibility of the monetary authorities are key aspects to have 
in consideration when in a ZLB situation. If the CB commits to maintain interest rate at 
a low level and maintain it at a lower level for longer than previously expected, it 
should diminish longer-term rates, support other asset prices and stimulate aggregate 
demand. (Bernanke et al. ( 2004) 
There are several ways of applying unconventional monetary policy, such as credit 
easing, quantitative easing (QE) and manipulations of the exchange rate. 
Credit easing aims to reduce specific interest rates and/or rebuild market failures; 
when the result is the expansion of the money supply it can be taken as a not pure form 
of QE. (Smaghi, 2009) This instrument can be used when the interest rate is above zero. 
(Smaghi, 2009) The objective of credit easing is the purchase of certain type of 
securities as to lower interest rates in specific credit markets, thus the CB hopes to 
improve the functioning of credit markets and ease the transmissions to the real 
economy. (Söderström and Westermark, 2009) 
Therefore, policies that unusually increase the money base, embracing lending 
programmes and asset purchases, are called QE measures. Credit easing, which eases 
credit facilities, can be taken as a special form of QE programme if it increases the 
monetary base. 
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An alternative way of uplifting the economy is through the depreciation of the 
exchange rate. The CB could purchase foreign securities and currency, instead of 
purchasing domestic securities. (Söderström and Westermark, 2009) It is relevant to 
note that because the exchange rate and inflation expectations are linked, a lower 
exchange rate will lead to higher inflation expectations and thus lower real interest rates. 
(Söderström and Westermark, 2009) 
Quantitative easing is a measure taken by the CBs with the aim of expanding 
money supply that affects the liability side of the central bank’s asset side. (Fawley and 
Neely, 2013) This measure should be only applied when the interest rate is zero or close 
to it. (Smaghi, 2009) 
A quantitative monetary policy aims to influence the money supply. Often 
described as the central bank balance sheet effects on the asset side. (Söderström and 
Westermark, 2009) 
In order to do so the monetary authority creates money and uses it to purchase 
financial assets from private investors such as insurance companies, banks and pension 
funds. Money is created without the need of printing and it is simply achieved by an 
increase of credit on the central bank’s account. (Delivorias, 2015) 
As CBs purchase large amounts of assets, prices rise, thus decreasing by definition 
the interest rate associated with them. Lower interest rates decrease borrowing costs, 
increasing investment and consumption. Therefore, it is relevant to understand how the 
main transmission mechanisms work on affecting asset prices, interest rates and the real 
economy. (Joyce et al., 2011)  
As agents should believe in long-term low policy rates as to lower their 
expectations of the interest rates, quantitative easing purchases can help those 
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expectations become credible. When the CB buys long-term government bonds it 
affects the long-term sovereign bond yields and longer-term rates in general, giving a 
sign that the short-term interest rate will, in fact, be lower in the future. (Söderström and 
Westermark, 2009) 
As seen before, there are several factors influencing how unconventional monetary 
policy should be executed and how it affects the economy. 
As mentioned before, the way through which monetary policy affects the various 
elements of the economy is called the transmission mechanism and it works across 
different channels.  
The research of how the monetary institutions can manipulate the economy, how 
the markets react to those actions and what channels allow the standard and non-
standard policies to reach the targets settled by the CBs is not a new topic in the 
economic literature. These topics are again in vogue due to the recent unconventional 
monetary policies. 
The literature is not consensual in which are the most important channels. Below, 
the channels most seen in the literature will be presented, namely the policy-signalling 
channel, the portfolio balance channel and the liquidity premia. (Joyce et al., 2011)  
The macro/policy news, also known as the signalling channel, denotes to the 
knowledge that economic agents obtain with announcements of QE and incorporate it 
into their decisions. This channel can have an ambiguous effect on yields because QE 
can indicate lower policy rates in the short-run but can signal higher inflation in the long 
run. (Joyce et al., 2011) 
The portfolio balance channel results from the actions that agents do to remodel 
their portfolio in response to asset purchases made through QE programmes. Another 
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effect of this channel is the increase in the wealth of the agents when the monetary 
authority buys their assets. (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011) Assuming imperfect 
substitution between assets, a variation of quantity of a specific asset will lead, ceteris 
paribus, to a variation in its relative expect rate of return. (Joyce et al., 2011) Thus, 
asset purchases made through QE programmes are expected to decrease bond yields and 
drive investors to raise their demand on additional long run assets. 
Therefore, QE purchases have two main effects through this channel: the increase 
in assets prices, by diminishing yields that will decrease the cost of borrowing; and an 
increase in consumption as higher asset prices increase the agents’ wealth. This channel 
is argued to influence the markets right after the QE announcement and throughout 
time, as investors need time to rebalance their portfolios. (Joyce et al., 2011) 
Assuming that a longer-term asset is riskier than a short-term one, agents ask for a 
compensation, which is reflected in the price, for holding a long-term asset – the so-
called term premium. When the monetary authorities buy this kind of assets, investors 
will ask for less compensation for holding these assets and term premium will thus fall. 
A reduction on term premium leads to a reduction of the long-term real rates. (Fawley 
and Neely, 2013) 
The signalling channel affects expected policy rates and the portfolio balance 
channel reduces the term premium – spreads of long-run interest rates over expected 
policy rate - and the risk premia – the asked return on riskier assets relative to riskless 
assets. (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011) 
A scenario defines a liquid market where there are enough assets for “normal” 
transactions without shortage, i.e. no difficulty in exchanges. When markets are under 
stress, they can become illiquid and the liquidity premium – the value asked in order to 
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compensate the agent because of the risk of holding a less liquid asset - may rise. (Joyce 
et al., 2011) Thus, QE purchases may act through the liquidity premia channel because 
those purchases may ease and diminish the cost of selling assets that investors face. It is 
worth mentioning that this channel may only be active during the asset purchases lead 
by the CB. (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011) 
As the reader could notice, these mechanisms, although they were analysed 
separately, produce their outcomes simultaneously. Their strength depends on the 
economic and financial structure of each economy. 
As the aim of this dissertation is to study the effect of unconventional monetary 
policies into the long-term bond yields, it is relevant to understand the elements of such 
yield and the mechanisms that may influence it. 
Prospects of future policy interest rate variations affect longer-term market interest 
rates, because these are constructed via the expectations of short-term rates. The impact 
of market rate variations on rates of long-term maturities (i.e., long-term banking 
lending rates, 10-year Government bond yields) is less direct than in shorter maturities. 
Accordingly, the liquidity premium theory indicates that assets with different 
maturities are not perfect substitutes. Uncertainty and risk aversion are factors that lead 
investors to prefer more liquid assets. Risk adverse agents prefer short-run investments 
as these types of assets have a limited exposure to risk and their capital is stationary for 
a shorter period. Thus, the long-term interest rate is constructed by the average of the 
actual and the expected short-run interest rates and the liquidity premium. The liquidity 
premium is the compensation in return asked by the investors in order to bear the risk of 
possessing a longer-term and, probably, a less liquid asset. (Abreu et al., 2012) 
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The study of the behaviour of long-term sovereign bond yields has been an 
important field in the economic world for a long period. Authors have found that its 
behaviour usually depends on the time span that it is studied, because of economic 
scenarios. 
The credit risk, liquidity risk and the overall risk aversion of agents are factors that 
Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) refer as relevant for long-term sovereign yields. 
While Afonso and Rault (2010) studied the role of government balance-to-GDP ratio, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, the current account balance ratio, inflation surprises, the real 
effective exchange rate and a liquidity measure as determinants of long-run sovereign 
bond yields. 
When a country is not in a sound situation and its probability of default is high, 
investors will demand a higher credit risk premium to reimburse them from holding that 
risk. Government default risk is considered to result from the fiscal condition of the 
country because it is usually measured by the debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
(Klepsch and Wollmershäuser, 2011) In the occurrence of a weakening of the sovereign 
current account balance, the long-run interest rates might increase. (Afonso and Rault, 
2010) 
Unconventional measures that are directed at, for example, sovereign bonds will 
increase the available funds for governments, which will decrease their probability of 
default. Thus, non-standard policies might decrease long-term bond yields through the 
reduction of the credit risk. 
If an investor suspects that a security will have low demand in poor market 
conditions, the demanded yield needs to be higher because the agent will require a 
liquidity premium in order to buy the asset. Thus, mismatches of wills on the financial 
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markets increase transaction costs and will increase the asked yield. (Klepsch and 
Wollmershäuser, 2011) Generally, a better fiscal position reduces the real long-term 
interest rate, however, Afonso and Rault (2010) have found that an increase in stocks of 
government debt diminishes the real interest yield in some countries. Other literature 
has reached the same conclusions and there might be two reasons for such event: the 
market may be having a mispricing behaviour, or the market may be welcoming the 
increase in liquidity. Thus, QE purchases directed at long-term Government bonds may 
decrease the long-term bond yield. (Afonso and Rault, 2010) 
It is worth mentioning that there is not a consensus about the weight of deficit and 
Government debt on long-term interest rates. 
Risk aversion portrays the attitude of investors towards risk. When in times of 
uncertainty investors tend to be more risk averse.  (Klepsch and Wollmershäuser, 2011)   
Literature usually uses equity market volatility as a proxy for investors’ risk aversion. 
Inflation and real exchange rate may be an indicator of monetary authorities’ 
activity. Sovereign risk may rise in the occurrence of high or expected high inflation. In 
the study of Afonso and Rault (2010) inflation had a negative relation to real long-term 
sovereign yields. The real exchange rate also had a negative relation with the long-term 
bond yield in the majority of the countries analysed. 
It is clear that the study of long-term sovereign bond yields has mapped various 
scenarios, not all consensual. 
Unconventional monetary policies are multifactorial, depending not only on the 
type of shock that happened but also on the approach led by the monetary authorities, 
the specifications of the economy and the motivations behind the QE programmes. In 
the next section, each programme will be explained in particular. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
The scope of this dissertation is to evaluate the effects of the announcements and the 
purchases of quantitative easing on the variation of the long-term bond interest rates in 
the four main economies under quantitative easing measures - United States of America, 
Japan, United Kingdom and Euro Zone. Expectations are not inside the scope of this 
dissertation. The period analysed was from 1999 to 2016 for all countries using monthly 
and quarterly frequency, exceptions may occur.  
In this chapter, the general model is presented and design of the QE policies and the 
methodology will be explained separately by country. 
4.1. The Model 
To obtain the answers proposed by this study it was decided to employ a regression 
using the target variable, the factors that influence it and QE specific variables. After 
analysing the literature on the determinants of the yields and the yields spreads, it was 
possible to compile the most important elements used for the analysis. 
Several authors have shown that the main determinants of the long-term Government 
bond interest yields are the credit risk and the investors’ risk aversion. Besides those 
determinants, other factors must be taken in consideration when measuring the effect of 
unconventional monetary policies into the variation of the yields, such as international 
risk, the economic cycle, the stance of monetary policy, real effective exchange rate and 
last but not least, the announcements and actions of outstanding monetary measures. In 
order to measure these determinants and actions one must use proxies. Below follows 
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the explanation for the specific variables used, concluding with a general model that 
serves as a base for the country-by-country analysis showed afterwards in this chapter. 
The chosen dependent variable is the variation of the long-run Government bond yield 
with 10 years of maturity. The dependent variable and the lagged level of the long-term 
Government bond yield are included in the left-hand side of the regression. As a 
representation on the stance for conventional monetary policy, the instrumental rate for 
each economy is used. 
The credit risk, as explained on the ECB monthly report of May 2014 (ECB, 2014), is 
classically related with country ratings and default risk of a specific country. Debt and 
deficit-to-GDP ratio, structure of debt maturity, interest expenditure-to-GDP or interest 
expenditure-to-tax revenue ratios usually measure it. In the model it will be used the 
Debt-to-GDP ratio in order to measure sovereign’s credit risk. During the tests, 
manipulations of this indicator were used, such as the growth rate and the variation 
comparing with the previous period analysed. 
The aggregate banking assets-to-GDP ratio and the banking equity-to-assets ratio which 
together represent the total assets held by the financial sector are the variables used by 
(Gerlach et al. (2010) and Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) in order to assess the 
impact of the sovereign risk channel into the long-term interest rate. When possible 
these variables will be used in addiction of the typical debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Several proxies are used to evaluate the investors’ risk aversion. Klepsch and 
Wollmershäuser (2011) explain that corporate bonds spreads and equity market 
volatility are used to size investors’ risk aversion. In the same line of thought, the ECB 
(2014) specifies that US corporate bond spreads and US stock market implied volatility 
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(VIX) are both valid proxies. Gambacorta et al. (2012) explain that the VIX is an 
indicator of financial turmoil and economic risk and adds that it should capture 
uncertainty shocks that may have affected the “macro financial dynamics” throughout 
the crisis. Thus, the variable chosen was the VIX index, which weights the volatility of 
the US equity market. 
As a control variable to regulate for economic cycles, the industrial production index 
(INDPRO) is used because it proxies output. (Peersman, 2011) During the tests, 
manipulations of this indicator were used, such as the growth rate and the variation 
comparing with the previous period analysed. 
Afonso and Kazemi (2017) found evidence that the effective exchange rate is a 
determinant of the long-term sovereign yield in the Euro area. Thus, it is be included in 
the study as to observe if it is also a determinant on the other economies studied. 
Last but not least, the announcements related with QE and the respective purchases are 
the variables used to measure the unconventional monetary policy in study, i.e. 
Quantitative Easing. Therefore, a dummy is created, called ANN that will take the value 
1 when CBs make announcements of QE programmes in that month and 0 otherwise. 
The variable QE will take the value of the asset purchases made by CBs in the months 
that the actual purchases occurred in the respective currency of the economy being 
treated at the time. Tables VI, VII, VIII and IX scrutinize the announcements considered 
for the empirical analysis.  
For a full list of the variables used, their time series name, database and nomenclature 
on EViews, consult tables II, III, IV and V in the appendix.  
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Placing together the variables mentioned above in a regression equation and taking into 
consideration the high persistence of financial time-series, the following regression is 
used to assess the effect of Quantitative Easing into the variation of long-run 
Government bond interest yields: 




 t + 𝛽4  
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 t + 𝛽5  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 t + 𝛽6 𝑉𝐼𝑋 t   
+ 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂 t + 𝛽8 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 t + 𝛽8 𝐴𝑁𝑁 t + 𝛽9 𝑄𝐸 t + 𝜀𝑡 , 
with t = 1, …, 204 denoting the monthly time dimension or t = 1, …, 68 denoting the 
quarterly time dimension depending on the time period being analysed. Including 𝛼 that 
denotes the constant and 𝜀 denoting the error term for all models. 
The econometric tests were conducted using the statistics software EViews 9. For all the 
estimations, an OLS regression was employed with HAC correction for standard errors 
and covariance. 
4.2. Methodology 
The model was built crossing references about the determinants of the long-term 
Government bond yield and QE policies and so there is not a framework to strictly 
follow. The goal is to find the most significant explanatory variables for the variation of 
the long-term Government bond yield on the time spans used, which can lead to 
different variables employed for different countries. Thus not resulting in a uniform 
model but in the most explanatory model possible given the economy and period 
analysed. In order to do so, sub-time samples are employed and all the explanatory 
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variables are tested (including lags, growth rates, variations) and then selected in order 
to find the determinants that compose the best the variation of the long-run Government 
bond yield.  
Four models specifications compose the analysis:  
 Entire time sample: 1999/2000 to 2015/2016; 
 Time sample: 1999/2000 to 2007; 
 Time sample: 2007 to 2015/2016; 
 Time sample: 2007 to 2015/2016 – only QE related variables. 
On the appendix is presented the mandate of the CB in question, some of the roots for 
the crisis, a timeline of the QE measures and the four regressions resulting from the 
empirical analysis, for the four economies feathered in this essay.  
5. Results and Discussion 
In this section, the results for each group will be presented and discussed. From 
here the coefficients are present with three decimal places. The exact numbers are in the 
related tables of each economy in the attachment sections of this dissertation.  
5.1. United States 
 
In the current section it is presented the results of the empirical analysis and 
discussion for the US economy. In order facilitate the interpretation, the following 
categorization will be used to address the regressions used: 
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 1M: 1999 M04 – 2007 M12 
 1Q: 1999 Q3 – 2007 Q4 
 2M: 2008 M01 – 2015 M12  2Q: 2008 Q1 – 2015 Q4 
 3M (QE only): 2008 M01 – 2015 M12  3Q (QE only): 2008 Q1 – 2015 Q4 
 4M: 1999 M03 – 2015 M12  4Q: 1999 Q3 – 2015 Q4 
 
Across all regressions of both time frequencies the LRYield(-1) presents a negative 
coefficient, which can be explain by the construction of the VLRYield itself:  VLRYield 
= LRYield – LRYield(-1). The value of the coefficient ranges between -0.449 and -
0.088. 
The variation of the instrumental rate (VDiscountR = DiscountR – DiscountR(-1)) 
has a negative coefficient for the regression 1M (VDiscountR(-1) = -0.189; 
VDiscountR(-2) = -0.228) and 4M (VDiscountR(-1) = -0.103) and a positive coefficient 
for the regression 3M (VDiscountR(-1) = 0.305). A different variable used in the 
literature as a proxy for the stance of MP is the effective federal funds rate. However, as 
it was not statically significant (SS) in the regressions tested and it was removed from 
the analysis. This happened because, although the Fed sets a target on the EFFR, the 
DiscountR is the tool used by the Fed to manipulate the money supply and achieve the 
EFFR target.  
As explained before, ABAY, EQTA, and Debt/GDP are measures for sovereign’s 
credit risk. The size of the banking sector within a country, ABAY, has a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient on equation 2Q (0.060) and 4Q (0.043) and a 
statistically significant and negative coefficient on equation 1M (-0.023). VABAY 
presents a negative coefficient on equation 2M (-0.034) and 4M (-0.024), while in the 
other equations, it was not statistically significant and thus it was removed from those 
TGasparSilva | THE EFFECT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING PROGRAMMES ON LONG-TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS 
27 
 
regressions. EQTA presented a positive coefficient on 1M (7.309) and a negative 
coefficient on 2M (-0.345), 4M (-0.131) and 4Q (-0.267); in the other equations, it was 
not statistically significant.  One possible explanation for the positive coefficients for 
the size of the banking sector within a country and the banking equity-to-banking assets 
ratio is that the recovery of the banking system improved the yields and consequently 
the VLRYield. (Klepsch and Wollmershäuser, 2011) On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient may represent that a higher-sized banking system or a decrease of equity 
regarding the banking assets indicates a more fragile banking sector with a higher risk 
of bank default and as bank rescue packages have a negative impact in the economy, the 
VLRYield increases. 
The Debt/GDP represents the Government’s default risk. A higher value indicates a 
higher probability of default, which, in theory, leads to an increase of the VLRYield.  
(Klepsch and Wollmershäuser, 2011) Debt/GDP has only retrieved a SS positive 
coefficient on equation 1M (0.111), while VDebt/GDP has a negative coefficient on 1Q 
(-0.214).  
The indicator for financial turmoil presents negative coefficients in all equations 
(between -0.011 and -0.034), although not being statistically significant on 4M. A 
negative relation between VIX and VLRYield may indicate that investors prefer long-
run instruments when financial markets are not sound.  
The real exchange rate was statistically significant through monthly and quarterly 
analysis, with the exception of equation 4M. On the monthly analysis, the coefficient 
was positive (in 1M: 0.034 and in 2M: 0.009), while in the quarterly analysis it presents 
a negative coefficient (in 1Q: -4.731, 2Q: -7.369 and in 4Q: -5.194). The signal of the 
coefficient for REER is not consensual through the literature. For example, Afonso and 
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Rault (2010) obtained positive and negative relations between these variables, mostly 
negative for the countries analysed. In this study, the REER was significant in more 
expressions using quarterly data than with monthly data and the coefficients were 
higher. 
The variables used to measure output (INDPRO and VGR_INDPRO) were always 
SS, displaying a positive relation with the dependent variable. The positive relation 
reflects the increase on LRYields due to the improvement of the overall economy 
measured by the industrial production index. The VGR_INDPRO (between 11.330 and 
4.201) has a much higher coefficient than INDPRO (between 0.069 and 0.004), which 
may be explained by the lag between the announcement of the indicator and the 
necessity of adapting expectations by the agents on the VLRYield.  
Across the monthly and the quarterly analysis, two variables were used to assess the 
impact of the announcement of QE: ANN_QE and ANN_QE(-2). ANN_QE gave a SS 
negative relation in equation 3M (-0.100), 4M (-0.050), 2Q (-0.370), 3Q (-0.336) and 
4Q (-0.318), while ANN_QE(-2) was only significant and negative on the quarterly 
equations 2Q (-0.183) and 4Q (-0.318). Although it did not retrieve the expected signal 
on 3Q, it was not statistically significant. Overall, the announcement of QE policies 
decreased the VLRYield, as seek by the authorities.  
The variables used to represent the purchases made under the QE policies were: 
QE_ST, QE_ST(-1), QE_CT and QE_CT(-1). As both variations gave the same 
coefficients, QE_ST and QE_ST(-1) were chosen as they produced better outputs in 
term of overcoming auto-correlation problems. QE_ST had a positive coefficient on 3M 
(1.85E-06), 4M (1.27E-06 but not SS), 2Q (4.89E-06), 3Q (6.19E-06) and 4Q (4.83E-06). 
The QE_ST(-1) was only SS in 2M with a small positive coefficient equal to 2.89E-06. 
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In the US’s case, the estimations made under the quarterly frequency performed 
better than the ones made on the monthly basis as they presented a higher R2 and 
Durbin-Watson statistics closer to two.  
Reviewing the results, the effect of QE policies on the VLRYield was not clear in 
sign and presented modest coefficients.   
The results for the United States are presented in table X. 
5.2. United Kingdom 
The results of the empirical analysis and discussion for the UK are presented in this 
section. For ease of reading, the following nomenclature will be used to address the 
regressions executed: 
 1M: 2000 M03 – 2007 M12  1Q: 2000 Q2 – 2007 Q4 
 2M: 2008 M01 – 2016 M05   2Q: 2008 Q1 – 2016 Q1 
 3M (QE only): 2008 M01 – 2015 M12  3Q (QE only): 2008 Q1 – 2017 Q1 
 4M: 1999 M06 – 2015 M01  4Q: 2000 Q2 – 2016 Q2 
 
The LRYield(-1) presents a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 4M 
(-0.085) and 2Q (-0.246); and LRYield(-2) in 1Q (-0.244) and 4Q (-0.233). This can be 
explain by the construction of the VLRYield itself:  VLRYield = LRYield – LRYield(-
1). The VLRYield(-1) has a positive relation with the dependent variable and it was 
only statistically significant on 1M (0.219) and 2M (0.284). The VLRYield(-2) presents 
a negative coefficient of -0.176 significant at the 10% level. The variation of the 
LRYield was not statistically significant on the quarterly basis analysis and thus it was 
removed from the estimations. 
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The variation of the instrumental rate in UK’s case is the bank rate (VBankRate = 
BankRate – BankRate(-1)). The first lag of this variation is SS and has a negative 
coefficient for the regression 1M (-0.317), 1Q (-0.487) and 4Q (-0.173); while the 
second lag has a negative relation with the dependent variable on equation 2M (-0.234) 
and 2Q (-0.232). Therefore, this variable does not present the expected relation with the 
VLRYield, as the CB decreases the BankRate (= VBankRate) in order to decrease the 
long-term interest rates and consequently the LRYield and the VLRYield. 
The indicators for sovereign risk used were VDebt/GDP, VDebt/GDP(-1) and 
VDebt/GDP(-2). VDebt/GDP was the only statistically significant variable, presenting a 
positive relation with the dependent variable on equation 1Q of 0.127: an 
increase/decrease on VDebt/GDP leads to an increase/decrease on VLRYield. 
The VIX retrieved a negative coefficient in all the equations, although not SS on 1Q. 
The coefficient was rather small: varying from -0.006 to -0.032. As seen before on the 
US case, a negative relation may hint that investors swift their demand from short-term 
riskier assets to safer assets such as the Government bonds, thus increasing the liquidity 
of Government bond assets and lowering its yield. 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) was not statistically significant in any 
regression across both time frequencies. 
The proxy for output INDPRO presents a positive (and SS) relation with the 
VLRYield on equations 4M (0.011) and 1Q (0.081). The VGR_INDPRO has a SS 
negative coefficient of -0.808 when analysed for the period 2000-2007 on a quarterly 
basis. Some literature about the determinants of the long-term Government bond yields, 
such as Gerlach et al. (2010), found evidence that in the period previous to the financial 
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crisis (2000 – 2007), the fundamentals were being underrated by the investors, which 
can explain the negative relation between the VGR_INDPRO and the VLRYield on 1Q. 
In order to appraise the impact of the QE policies on the VLRYield, the following 
variables were used: ANN_QE (t=0,-1,-2,-3) and AFP (t=0,-1,-2,-3). Regarding the 
announcements of QE: ANN_QE presented a negative coefficient, which was not 
statistically significant. Only ANN_QE(-1) presented a SS positive coefficient of 0.22 
on 2Q and 0.31 on 3Q. The variables used to measure the effective purchases of assets 
under QE measures did not present homogenous signals for the coefficients. The AFP 
showed a positive SS coefficient, although small, of -1.91E-06 on equation 1Q. The 
AFP(-1) has a small but positive SS coefficient on 3M (1.58E-07) and 2Q (1.32E-06). The 
AFP(-2) presents a SS negative coefficient of -6.61E-08 on 2M and of -1.04E-07 on 4M. 
Last but not least, the AFP(-3) has a SS positive and small coefficient on 3M of -1.75E-
07.  
The effect of QE policies on the VLRYield is not clear due to its small coefficients 
and opposite signs throughout the estimations. 
In the UK’s case, the estimations made under the quarterly frequency performed 
better than the ones made on the monthly basis as they presented a higher R2 and 
Durbin-Watson statistics closer to two. However, it was not possible to obtain more 
statically significant variables than in the monthly analysis. 
The results for the United Kingdom are presented in table XI. 
5.3. Euro Area 
In this section, the outputs from the regressions about the EA are presented. 
To facilitate the reading, the following cipher will be used to address the regressions 
executed: 
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 1M: 2000 M02 – 2007 M12   1Q: 2000 Q1 – 2007 Q4 
 2M: 2008 M01 – 2016 M12  2Q: 2008 Q1 – 2016 Q4 
 3M (QE only): 2008 M01 – 2017 M02  3Q (QE only): 2008 Q1 – 2017 Q1 
 4M: 1999 M04 – 2017 M01  4Q: 2000 Q3 – 2016 Q4 
 
The first variables analysed were the LRYield in its lagged (t = -3) form, and the 
VLRYield (t = -2 and t = -3). The LRYield(-3) has a negative but not statistically 
significant coefficient on 1M, while the VLRYield(-1) displays a negative relation on 
1Q and a positive on 1M and 2M, though never presenting SS coefficients for these 
equations. This variable presented SS positive coefficients on 4M (0.140), 2Q (0.213) 
and 4Q (0.25). The VLRYield(-2)  has a negative, but not SS, coefficient on 1Q and a 
negative relation (-0.164) significant at the 10% level. 
The instrumental rate – the main refinancing operations rate (mro) – retrieved 
outputs with opposite signs, but when comparing their magnitudes it resulted in an 
overall positive relation: a decrease/increase on the policy rate leads to a 
decrease/increase on the VLRYield. The mro(-3) has a positive (0.245) SS relation with 
the dependent variable. The VMRO delivered a positive non-SS coefficient on 4M and a 
SS negative coefficient (-0.208) on 1M; while VMRO(-1) displayed a negative but not 
SS coefficient on 2M and a SS positive coefficient (0.357) on 2Q. 
Conventional theory indicates that higher levels of Debt/GDP increase a country’s 
default probability leading to investors requiring a term premium in order to buy 
Government bonds, which further leads to higher rates for these instruments. Recent 
literature about the influence of the fundamentals on the process of expectations of the 
financial agent has sparked after the financial crisis in 2007-2009. Gerlach et al. (2010) 
and Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) found evidence that agents may have under 
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looked the impact of Debt/GDP on periods previous to the crisis. The results found in 
this essay support that theory for the EA. The Debt/GDP(-1) presented a negative SS 
coefficient (-0.077) on 1Q (2000 Q2 – 2007 Q4) with the VLRYield, while VDebt/GDP 
presented a positive SS relation (0.084) on 4Q (2000 Q3 – 2016 Q4); and 
GR_Debt/GDP presented a positive SS coefficient of 12.299 when analysed for the 
2008 Q1 – 2016 Q4 timeframe. 
The VIX presented a negative relation in all equations which was only SS on 2M, 
1Q, 2Q and 4Q with coefficients ranging from -0.003 to -0.028.  
The analysis of the impact of the real effective exchange rate (REER) on the 
VLRYield revealed a negative influence on the period before the crisis (1M and 1Q) 
and a positive relation when analysed from 2008 to 2016 (2M and 2Q). Supporting that 
REER is a determinant of the sovereign yields in the EA, as found by Afonso and 
Kazemi (2017). 
Overall, the INDPRO variables displayed a positive relation on the periods before 
the crisis (1M and 1Q): an increase/decrease of the industrial production index leads to 
an increase/decrease on the variation of the long-term Government bond yields 
(VLRYield). In particular, the GR_INDPRO has a strong coefficient of 14.399 
significant at a 5% level. 
Finally, the QE measures are represented by: ANN_QE(t = 0, -1, -2 and -3) and 
APP(t = 0, -1, -2 and -4). On a monthly basis, ANN_QE(-1) displays a negative SS 
relation with the dependent variable (-0.096);ANN_QE(-2) also has a negative 
coefficient of -0.151 on 2M and -0.141 on 4M. On a quarterly basis, only the 
ANN_QE(-2) is SS with a positive coefficient of 0.299 on 4Q.  
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The asset purchases under QE programmes generated coefficients with opposite 
signs across the empirical analysis. The APP(-1) has a small positive SS coefficient on 
2M. The APP(-2) also has small positive coefficients, which are SS on 3M and 4M. The 
APP(-4) was the only variable of this group to provide a negative SS coefficient on the 
estimations – it has a negative coefficient of -4.16E-06 on 3M and of -6.34E-06 on 4M. 
On a quarterly basis, the APP(-4) is the only variable with a statistically significant 
coefficient. It displayed a negative coefficient of -1.47E-06 on 4Q. 
The equation exclusively with QE related variables on a monthly basis – 3M – have 
only two statistically significant variables with opposite directions and similar 
magnitudes: APP(-2) and APP(-4). No QE related variables were statistically significant 
on the homologous equation on a quarterly basis (3Q). 
In the Eurozone’s case the quarterly regressions provided better R2 and Durbin-
Watson statistics than the regressions tested on a monthly basis. 
The results for the Euro Area are presented in table XII. 
5.4. Japan 
In this section, it is presented the results and discussion from the empirical study 
regarding the Japanese case. 
For ease of reading, the following nomenclature will be used to address the regressions 
executed: 
 1M: 1999 M05 – 2007 M12   1Q: 2000 Q2 – 2007 Q4 
 2M: 2008 M01 – 2015 M12  2Q: 2008 Q1 – 2015 Q4 
 3M (QE only): 2008 M01 – 2015 
M02 
 3Q (QE only): 2008 Q1 – 2015 
Q4 
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 4M: 1999 M06 – 2015 M01  4Q: 1999 Q4 – 2015 Q4 
 
The variables regarding the LRYield were only statistically significant on equation 
2Q. The LRYield(-2) presents a negative coefficient of -0.956 significant at 1% level. 
While LRYield(-3) has a positive coefficient around 0.178 at a 10% significance level. 
Overall, the effect of the lags LRYield on the dependent variable is negative, as 
expected due to the construction of the VLRYield itself:  VLRYield = LRYield – 
LRYield(-1). 
The VLRYield(-2) displays a negative relation (-0.185) on 4M at 1% significance 
level (-0.167) on 4Q at 5% significance level. The VLRYield(-4) has a negative 
coefficient on 4M (-0.145) significant at the 5% level. The lags of the dependent 
variable were not SS in any other regression. 
The instrumental rate used by the BOJ is the DiscountR. A decrease/increase of the 
DiscountR should decrease/increase the LRYield. Thus, a decrease/increase of the 
VDiscountR should decrease/increase the VLRYield. The VDiscountR(-2) has a 
negative coefficient of -0.367 on 4Q and is SS at the 5% level, while on 2M it presents a 
positive relation (0.812) with a significance level of 1%. The VDiscountR(-1)  has a SS 
positive coefficient on 2Q and the VDiscountR(-3) has a SS positive on 1M. By 
analysing the magnitudes and the signs of the variables, it can be concluded that the 
VDiscountR evolves in the same direction as VLRYield, indicating that the monetary 
policies may have an impact on the long-term Government bond yield. 
A lower Debt/GDP ratio indicates sound public finances and a lower LRYield. In 
theory, the variables Debt/GDP, VDebt/GDP and GR_Debt/GDP should evolve in the 
same direction as the variable in study. Statistically significant and negative relations 
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were found on 1M (VDebt/GDP(-1): -0.443), on 2M (VDebt/GDP: -0.898) and on 2Q 
(Debt/GDP: -0.015). The GR_Debt/GDP variables display a strong positive relation on 
the dependent variable: equation 1M (GR_Debt/GDP(-1): 67.421), equation 2M 
(GR_Debt/GDP: 177.937) and on equation 4M (GR_Debt/GDP(-1): 15.874). The study 
of the Japanese public debt is, however, outside the scope of this essay. 
The VIX presents a negative relation in all the equations used and is statistically 
significant in every equation except for 2Q. 
The REER was SS on 2M and 2Q, displaying positive coefficients. As noted before, 
the literature is not consensual about the relation of the real effective exchange rate with 
the long-term bond yields. 
The INDPRO related variables were only statistically significant on a quarterly basis 
(1Q and 2Q). The variable INDPRO(-3) has a negative coefficient of -0.004 on 2Q, 
while VGR_INDPRO has a positive coefficient of 3.453 on 1Q. In general, there is 
evidence that an increase/decrease in output leads to an increase/decrease in the 
VLRYield. 
The variables concerning the announcements of QE policies were SS on 2Q and 3Q. 
The ANN has negative coefficients for 2Q (-0.094) and 3Q (-0.081), while the ANN(-1) 
presented a positive coefficient on 3Q (0.095). Combining the three statistically 
significative coefficients, ANN indicated a negative relation with the VLRYield: the 
announcements related with QE policies decreased the long-run Government bond 
yield. 
The asset purchases under QE measures revealed to be statistically significant on 
3M (QE(-1) = 7.98E-07), 4M (QE(-5) = -5.16E-07) and 4Q (QE = -3.35E-07). Comparing 
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the magnitude of the coefficients, QE has a slight negative relation with the dependent 
variable.  
In the Japanese case, the quarterly based regressions presented higher R2 and 
Durbin-Watson statistics closer to two than the monthly-based regressions.  
Overall, the results obtained indicate that QE policies may affect and reduce the 
VLRYield, although the magnitude and the signs of the coefficients do not allow 
definitive and “crystal clear” deductions. 
The results for Japan are presented in Table XIII. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to assess the impact of Quantitative Easing policies 
employed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 into the long-term Government bond 
interest rate of the United States of America, United Kingdom, Euro Area and Japan. By 
studying this relationship, the objective was to verify if QE measures have decreased the 
variation of the long-term Government bond yield using similar methodologies with 
monthly and quarterly data. 
In order to do so, the main problems for each economy were mapped out and, 
consequently, the aim and construction of each QE programme was described and 
empirically analysed on a monthly and on a quarterly basis. Several databases were 
needed to collect the data – data platforms, international data warehouses, as well as 
national sources. The dummy representing the announcement of QE required an 
extensive analysis of every press release about the topic for the four economies studied. 
In the United States of America case, it was observed that the announcements 
related to QE reduced the dependent variable. On the other hand, the Large Scale Asset 
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Purchases presented positive but negligible coefficients. Overall, this study provides 
support for the use of QE policies in the US, as the QE measures decreased the variation 
of the long-term Government bond yield. 
The announcements of the BOE’s QE programme presented positive outputs, which 
were only statistically significant on two out of eight regressions. Most of the 
statistically significant coefficients of the asset purchases under the Asset Facility 
Programme indicate a decrease on the explained variable. It is thus not possible to be 
assertive of the impact of QE measures on the variation of the long-term Government 
bond yield for the United Kingdom case. 
The outputs of the empirical analysis for the Euro Area and Japan were the most 
ambiguous of the group. Overall, the announcements of ECB’s QE supported the use of 
QE as a way of influencing and decreasing the variable in study. For the asset purchase 
under the Asset Purchase Programme it was not possible to assess if it reduced or 
augmented the variation of the long-term Government bond yield as all coefficients 
have negligible magnitudes. 
In the Japanese study, the announcements fashioned conflicting coefficients. When 
analysing the magnitude of the coefficients, there may be supporting evidence for the 
use of such policies. The asset purchases followed the same tendency but with much 
smaller coefficients than the announcements. 
Across all regressions within the economies studied, the equations with quarterly 
data presented better outputs (higher R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics closer to two).  
It is worth mentioning that, although it is outside of the scope for this essay, 
evidence was found supporting some of the literature previous mentioned: the 
determinants of the long-term Government bond yields may differ according to the time 
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span analysed, after and during the crisis, and the same determinant may influence the 
long-term bond yield with opposite signs depending on the time span in case. In 
addition, this essay found evidence supporting that bank and sovereign risk has become 
more and more interconnected. 
Although the results about the effect of QE measures on the variation of the long-
term Government bond yields were not always perceptible, this study remains 
meaningful, since it provides an overview of the design, operations and empirical 
assessment of the impact of the unconventional asset purchase programmes conducted 
by Central Banks in response to the financial crisis, for the United States of America, 
United Kingdom, Euro Area and Japan on monthly and quarterly time frequency. 
Further research can be pursued on this topic. An interesting expansion of this 
dissertation would be the inclusion of expectations into the model and/or a 
counterfactual analysis. 
In conclusion, this dissertation finds that Quantitative Easing measures do not 
produce equal results for every economy, and despite some favourable effects being 
visible, they appear to be small relatively to the size and type of the Quantitative Easing 
policies employed. 
 




Methodology: United States of America 
The end of the housing price bubble in 2006 had major effects into the economy. After 
two years, by the end of 2008, the output was falling; financial markets were debilitated 
and short-term rate was near the zero lower bound (ZLB). (Fawley and Neely, 2013)  
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) has a dual mandate. The dual mandate refers to the 
price stability goal – 2% target for the inflation rate; and maximum stability 
employment – all committee’s decision must be acquainted by an eclectic collection of 
labour market indicators. (Chicago Fed Letter, 1998) 
On September 2008 the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers worsen the already debilitated 
financial market, risk premia went up and liquidity went down. The lack of dollars was 
felt across the globe and monetary and fiscal authorities had to intervene to grant dollar 
liquidity to financial and non-financial firms. In the same week of Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy the Fed extended its foreign exchange swap lines with foreign central banks. 
More actions aimed at improving liquidity, both national and internationally, were 
conducted. For instance, swap lines with the BOE, ECB and the Swiss National Bank 
would serve whichever quantity of funds needed; the US Treasury assured money 
market mutual fund (MMMF) deposits; the Fed created a program to directly purchase 
high-grade commercial paper, the commercial paper funding facility (CPFF); and the 
term action facility (TAF). (Fawley and Neely, 2013) Initially the concern was to 
improve the functioning on the market but soon it had to change to include GDP growth 
recovery and the inflation target. Although all the extra measures and the decrease of 
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the Federal funds rate from more than 5% in 2007 to less than 1% at the end of 2008, 
the economy was not recovering as desired.  
Note that although all of these actions were not typical conventional policies they did 
not augment the monetary base. At the beginning the US followed a credit easing policy 
and only in 2008 with measures that increased the money supply it started to be QE 
approach. (Bernanke, 2009) On November 2008 the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) announced the Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP), a programme using the 
creation on money to buy, firstly, Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) debt and 
Mortgage-Based securities (MGS). After suggestions that the LSAP would be 
expanded, in March 2009 the FOMC expands the program in size and includes 
purchases of long-term Treasuries. This programme, also know as QE1 was downsized 
in size and type of assets purchases in September, November 2008 and finished mid-
2009.  
At the end of 2010, a FOMC stated its concerns about the low inflation level and 
Bernanke suggest the need of further QE. On November 2010, the FOMC announced a 
new programme with $600 billion purchases in Treasuries. QE2 ceases on the last 
quarter of 2011 as predicted.  
Before QE3, the FOMC announced the Maturity Extension Programme in late 2011 and 
it would last until the end of 2012. It entails the purchase of long-term securities and the 
sell short-term maturities.  
On September 2012 the last QE package is announced, QE3 starts as $40 billion 
monthly purchases of MBS and two months later is enlarged by $45 billion of long-term 
Treasury purchases. From December 2013 to September 2014, QE3 was contracted 
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seven times, by $5 billion monthly purchase for each kind of asset integrating the whole 
package. The last purchases under this measure were on October 2014.  
The federal fund rate started increasing in 2015 – to between 0,5 and 0,25%; and the 
discount rate between 0,75 and 1%.  
On table VI, the reader can find the full list of announcements – dates and information – 
regarding the US’ QE programmes and the policy rate updates. 
In order to measure the impact of the QE policies into the variation of the long-term 
Government bond yield, four distinct regressions were employed on monthly and 
quarterly basis:  
 Equation 1: from 1999 to 2007; 
 Equation 2: from 2008 to 2015; 
 Equation 3: from 2008 to 2015 with only QE related variables; 
 Equation 4: from 1999 to 2015. 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a monthly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2007: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−2 + (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃




+  𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝑒𝑞𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡 +  Δ 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝑒𝑞𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 




 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2015: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−1 +  Δ
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑡
+  Δ 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝑒𝑞𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a quarterly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2007: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−1 + Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  + Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡 +  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡
+  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 +  𝑞𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2015: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝑒𝑞𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡
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Methodology: United Kingdom 
The financial crisis in the United Kingdom led to a decreased in spending, turned 
markets less liquid and compromised the inflation target of 2%.  
As referred before, central banks may have different mandates. The Bank of England is 
responsible for price stability, i.e. inflation rate target, and backing the Government’s 
economic goals – such as growth and employment. (BOE, 2013) 
With the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, the Bank of England started 
implementing measures to augment the market liquidity in order to promote 
consumption. Initially the BOE increase its lending operations in value, beyond the 
needs of commercial banks to satisfy their reserve targets, and in collateral accepted. On 
April 2008 a Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was created, it was an instrument 
provided to banks and building societies that permitted the exchange of provisionally 
illiquid but first-rate quality mortgage-backed and other security for UK Treasury Bills. 
(Joyce et al., 2011) 
Notwithstanding the extra measures taken, the goals of the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) did not seem to be accomplished. Then at the beginning of 2009 the Asset 
Purchase Facility Fund was created as a subsidiary of the BOE. Her Majesty’s Treasury 
would reimburse the Fund from whichever costs associated with the Asset Purchase 
Facility (APF), meaning that the BOE would not be injured in any way possible for the 
AFP. The issuance of Treasury bills and cash management operations of the Debt 
Management Office (DMO) up to £50 billion allowed the Fund to purchase private 
sector assets, such as corporate bonds and commercial paper. The purchases began on 
February 2009 and the main asset bought at the time was UK Government bonds – so-
called gilts. (Joyce et al., 2011) 
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Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011) have noted that the liquidity premia channel was not 
relevant in the design of the purchases of gilts – because their market functioned 
efficiently; but was relevant on the purchases of private sector assets because these 
markets had liquidity problems.  
At the same time, the MPC feared that the inflation target of 2% would not be met. For 
this reason, it started reducing the instrumental rate, the so-called Bank Rate. During the 
fourth trimester of 2008 the Bank rate decreased 3 percentage points. In the beginning 
of 2009 it was reduced to 1,5% and in March the Bank Rate reached 0,5%. (Joyce, Tong 
and Woods, 2011) Overall the Bank Rate decreased from 5% to 0,5%. 
Only on March 2009 the processes of implementing monetary policy were reformed: 
when the MPC announced that central bank reserves would be used to fund the AFP and 
that the value of the purchases would be increased and the conditions of the acquisitions 
would change. (Joyce et al., 2011) As the goal of such policies were to increase the 
soundness of the markets implied and due to the large size of the programme, the MPC 
gather monthly to review the suitable scale of the purchases although it fixed targets 
over periods longer than a month. (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011) From this moment 
on, the AFP was officially an unconventional monetary policy tool. 
Monetary policy and financial stability responsibilities of the BOE resulting from the 
MPC’s 2% inflation target require operations in the sterling money markets. These 
operations are taken within the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF). (BOE, 2013) As a 
consequence of the reformulations on monetary policy made in March, these facilities 
were also amended: reserves objectives were suspended and the remuneration the all 
reserves started being at the Bank Rate. 
On March 2009 the first programme of QE was announced. It consisted in purchases up 
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to £75 billion in assets, mostly conventional gilts with maturity between five and 
twenty-five years. In order to increase the money supply, the purchases would be 
financed increasing the central bank reserves, which means by issuing money.  Until the 
end of the year the programme was expanded in value three times, in May, August and 
November, up to £200 billion. In August gilts with three years of maturity or more were 
included in the portfolio. On February 2010 the MPC maintained the stock of assets 
purchases financed by reserve issuance at £200 billion and the purchases of commercial 
paper and corporate bonds would be financed by DMO cash management operations 
and the issuance of Treasury bills. Although the efforts, GDP contracted in the end of 
2011 and beginning of 2012. On October 2011 the APF was augmented to £275 billion. 
The first revision on the maximum value for private asset purchases was on November 
2011. Her Majesty’s Treasury announced that the upper limit on APF private asset 
holdings decrease from £50 billion to £10 billion. The programme was expanded two 
times during 2012: up to £325 billion in March and to £375 billion in July. The BOE 
decided, on August 2016, to reduce the official Bank Rate from 0,5% to 0,25% and the 
stock of assets purchases financed by reserve issuance increased to £435 billion. Further 
alterations were not considered on the data due to lack of data for all variables included.  
The table VII portrays all the announcements used in the regression – dates and 
information – and the updates of the Bank Rate. 
In order to measure the impact of the QE policies into the variation of the long-term 
Government bond yields, four distinct regressions were employed on monthly and 
quarterly basis:  
 Equation 1: from 2000 to 2007; 
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 Equation 2: from 2008 to 2016; 
 Equation 3: from 2008 to 2015/2017 with only QE related variables; 
 Equation 4: from 2000 to 2016. 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a monthly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2007: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 +  Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−2 + 𝑣𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−2 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−2 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−3 +  𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−3 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  Δ
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑡−1
+  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−1
+  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a quarterly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2007: 
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∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−2 + 𝑣𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 + Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  + Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−2 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡
+  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡 +  𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2015: 
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Methodology: Euro Area 
The financial turmoil affected the Euro area (EA) in many ways: weak growth, several 
downwards revisions in the inflation level, investment went down and saving rates went 
up while consumption decreased. The European Central Bank (ECB) manages the Euro 
and designs and executes the monetary policy in the Euro zone. Its goal is price 
stabilization and maintaining an inflation level target around 2%. Besides its main aim, 
the ECB is assigned of the maintenance and supervision of the stabilization of the 
financial system in the EA. (Abreu et al., 2012) 
At the beginning of the financial crisis, in 2007, the ECB's main refinancing operations 
rate (MRO) was 4,25%. With the intention of improving the economics scenario, the 
rate suffered several downgrades and at the end of 2016 it reached the 0%. Although the 
European QE measures only started in 2015, the ECB was already fighting the decline 
of the economic indicators by reducing the instrumental rate and implementing less 
conventional monetary measures, such as the Longer-term Refinancing Operations 
(Net-LTRO) (which grant long-term refinancing to the financial market), the Targeted 
Longer-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) (which grant financing to credit 
institutions for periods up to four years) and the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), 
which had been employed since 2008 in order to improve the Euro’s situation. (Afonso 
and Kazemi, 2017) Until the beginning of 2015, the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) 
was composed by the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and the 
third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3). 
On the 22nd of January 2015, Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, announced the 
beginning of QE policies in the EA, with an extension of the APP. The Public Sector 
Purchase Programme (PSPP) in a fund managed by the Eurosystem to purchase bonds 
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issued by the EA’s central governments and debt securities from European institutions 
and national agencies at a rate of €60 billion per month, from March 2015 to September 
2016. On December 2015, regional and local government bonds are included in the list 
of eligible assets for purchase under the PSPP. Mario Draghi also announced that the 
measure will last “at least until” March 2017. (Demertzis and Wolff, 2016) On March 
2016, it is announced that the monthly purchases under APP will be booted up to €80 
billion starting on the next month. The Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) is 
the new addiction to the APP and it consists in the purchase by six Eurosystem national 
central banks (NCBs) of investment grade Euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank 
corporations settled in the EA. At the end of 2016, the ECB announced that the amount 
of monthly purchases under the APP would decrease to €60 billion starting the 
following April, not ceasing before December 2017. Purchases of securities with a yield 
to maturity below the interest rate of the ECB’s deposit facility will be permitted under 
the APP. The PSPP was also modified: Eurosystem central banks will have the 
possibility to accept cash as collateral in their securities lending facilities without having 
to reinvest it in a cash-neutral manner. Decreasing the minimum maturity for eligible 
securities from two years to one also broadens the maturity range accepted. Although 
data of 2017 is not included in the empirical analysis the following QE update it is 
worth mentioning. On January 2017 it is confirmed that the net asset purchased will be 
up to €60 billion a month from April until December 2017 or beyond. The ECB informs 
that only under PSPP, the purchases of assets with yields below the deposit facility rate 
(DFR) will be accepted, while the priority being the assets with yields above DFR, thus 
excluding the purchases of these types of assets under the CBPP3, the ABSPP and the 
CSPP. 
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On table VIII, the reader can find the full list of announcements – dates and information 
– regarding the EA’ QE policies and the policy rate updates. 
In order to measure the impact of the QE policies into the variation of the long-term 
Government bond yields, four distinct regressions were employed on monthly and 
quarterly basis:  
 Equation 1: from 2000 to 2007; 
 Equation 2: from 2008 to 2016; 
 Equation 3: from 2008 to 2017 with only QE related variables; 
 Equation 4: from 2000 to 2016/2007. 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a monthly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2007: 




)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + reer𝑡 +  reer𝑡−1 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑡−1 + gr_(
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 +  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−3 +  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−4 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2016: 
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∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2
+  𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−4 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a quarterly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2007: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑡−3 +  (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡
+  reer𝑡 +   𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑡−1 + gr_(
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + reer𝑡
+  Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2017 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−2
+  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2016: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 
+ 𝑎𝑛𝑛_𝑞𝑒𝑡−3 + 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡−4 + 𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑡−5 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 




The financial crisis of 2007-2008 impacted Japanese companies and led them to 
substantial decreases in investment. The Yen devaluated against the dollar and, overall, 
the Japanese economy sank – observed by the contraction of GDP. The Bank of Japan 
goal is price stability, which allows a sound development of the economy. (BOJ, 2013) 
The burst of the asset price bubble in the early 1990’s left the Japanese economy in 
stagnation and in 2001 with the burst of the  “dot-com bubble” led Japan’s economy at 
the hedge of regression. From the early 1990’s to 2005 the consumer price index (CPI) 
decreased 3% in total. (Ugai, 2006) Facing low growth, deflation and a wide number of 
non-performing loans in its baking system, the Bank of Japan launched the Quantitative 
Easing programme (QEP) and forward guidance, on March 2001. This unprecedented 
programme was based in three pillars: forward guidance – commitment to keep the 
interest rates at the zero level while in a scenario of deflation; increase of the BOJ’s 
balance sheet and increase of the outright purchases of longer-dated Japanese 
Government securities in order to change the composition of the CB’s balance sheet. 
This programme was active from 2001 to 2006. (Rogers et al., 2014) 
Two months after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, on the 2nd of December 2008, 
the BOJ announces the Special-Fund-Supplying Operations: a facility to lend an 
unlimited amount to banks at the uncollateralized overnight call rate (0,3%) and 
collateralized by corporate debt, active until April 2009. On December 19 it increases 
the monthly purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) from ¥1,2 trillion to ¥1,4 
trillion; decreased the uncollateralized overnight rate to 0,1% and announces the 
Corporate Financial Instruments programme (purchase of ¥3 trillions in commercial 
paper).  
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The BOJ created and expanded various programmes in order to improve the economy. 
Due to the broad number of announcements of policies, the programmes will be briefly 
mentioned below. The complete list of announcements with dates and information is on 
table IX. The Fixed-rate Operations (FRO) is intended to replace the SFSOs, started 
with purchases of ¥10 trillions in three-month maturities, on December 2009; was 
expanded twice until August 2010. The aim of the Growth-Supporting Funding Facility 
(GSFF) is the increasing of growth through direct provision of funds (¥3 trillion) to 
financial institutions. The GSFF was negotiated in the first half of 2010. This 
programme was increased on June 2011, March 2012 and January 2015 up to ¥10 
trillions.  
On October 2010, BOJ announces the Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) policy, 
which is composed by three measures: clarifying the conditions for exiting Zero 
Interest-Rate Policy (ZIRP); lowering the target for the uncollateralized overnight call 
rate; and the Asset Purchase Programme (APP). The goal of the APP was to “encourage 
the decline of longer-tem interest rates and various risk premia to further enhance 
monetary easing”. (Fawley and Neely, 2013) It included the purchases of short- and 
long-term Government securities, commercial paper, corporate bonds, exchange-traded 
funds (ETF) and Japanese real estate investment trusts (J-REITS), with a total size of 
¥35 trillions. Until 2013, when the end of APP was announced, it suffered ten increases 
in size and composition.  
On December 2012, Shinzo Abe is elected as prime minister of Japan and initiates, what 
is commonly called, the Abenomics. 
The Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) is introduced on April 2013 
and has two main objectives: “yield curve control”: control of short- and long-term 
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interest rates through market operations; and “inflation-overshooting commitment”: the 
BOJ commits itself to expand the monetary base until the inflation target of 2% is 
achieved (before the target was 1%). The BOJ stated that monetary based should 
increase at a annual pace of ¥60 - ¥70 trillion under QQE.  
 
In order to measure the impact of the QE policies into the variation of the long-term 
Government bond yields, four distinct regressions were employed on monthly and 
quarterly basis:  
 Equation 1: from 1999 to 2007; 
 Equation 2: from 2008 to 2015; 
 Equation 3: from 2008 to 2015 with only QE related variables; 
 Equation 4: from 1999 to 2015. 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a monthly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2007: 







)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015: 







)𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
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∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−2 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−3 + 𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡−2
+  𝑞𝑒𝑡−3 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2015: 






)𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−1 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡−5 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
The four regressions resulting from the analysis on a quarterly basis are: 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2000 to 2007: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−2 + Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−4 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + reer𝑡  
+ Δ 𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−3 + 𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−1 +  (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃




+  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  reer𝑡−3 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−3 +  𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2008 to 2015 – QE related variables only: 
∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡−1 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 Δ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 1999 to 2015: 
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∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + ∆ 𝐿𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−2 + 𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑡−2 + Δ (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−2 +  𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡
+  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡 +  𝑞𝑒𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
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Table I - Literature Review 
Authors Country coverage Objective Sample Period Methodology Results 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013) UK, US, UE, Japan Portray, for the Fed, BOE, 
BOJ and ECB, the 
situation and the motives 
for the QE programs 
during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 and the 
onward years 
  -Initial efforts of QE were directed to calm down financial 
market distress and shortly it became an instrument to hit 
inflation targets, stimulate real economy and contain European 
sovereign debt crisis; 
-BOJ and ECB acted more through loans to the banking system; 
-BOE and FED purchased high quantities of bonds; 
-As a result of QE held by all 4 BCs the monetary base highly 
increased but other monetary aggregates did not suffer the same 
impact. 
(Gambacorta, Hofmann and 
Peersman, 2012)  
Canada, Euro area, 
Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland, 
Sweden, UK, US 
Evaluate the 
macroeconomic effects of 
unconventional monetary 
policies during the 
financial crisis of 2007-
2009 
 
-Jan 2008 – Jun 2011; 
-Monthly data 
-Panel VAR -Exogenous rise in CB balance sheets at the zero lower bound 
leads to a momentary increase in economic activity and 
consumer prices; 
- The estimated output effects came out to be qualitatively 
comparable to the ones found in the literature on the effects of 
conventional monetary policy, while the impact on the price 
level is weaker and less persistent;  
-The unconventional measures had a similar macroeconomic 
effect across countries; 
-An immense expansion of CBs balance sheet is needed to 
achieve a strong monetary stimulus. 
(Rogers et al., 2014) USA, UK, EA, 
Japan 
Surveys the impact of 
unconventional MP on 
bond yields, stock prices 
and exchange rates for the 
Fed, BOE, BOJ and ECB 
during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 
Daily and intraday asset 




-Policies are effective in easing financial conditions when policy 
rates are trapped at the zero lower bound, evidently mostly by 
cutting term premia; 
-Influence of bond yields into assets prices appeared to have a 
higher effect on USA than in other economies. 
(Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011) 
 
UK Assess the effect of QE 
made by BoE on financial 
markets and economy in 
general 
  -Unconventional monetary policy made a significant effect on 
the economy but the precise magnitudes are uncertain. 
(Joyce et al., 2011) 
 
UK Assess the effect of QE 




2009: February, March, 
May, August and 
November; 2010: 
February; 
- Two-day window after 
announcements; 
-Time-series: December 
91 – December 09; 
-Event-study; 
-Time-series 
econometrics (VAR and 
GARCH-M); 
-QE decrease medium to long-run government bond yields; 
- Main transmission channel: portfolio balance channel; 
(Baumeister and Benati, 2010) 
 
US & UK Evaluate the 
macroeconomic effects of 
a reduction on the long-
-1954 – 2011 -Time-varying parameter 
structural VAR (TVP-
VAR) 
-A compression in the long-term yield spread employs a 
prevailing effect on both inflation and output when in a zero 
lower bound situation, as in the case of the U.S. and the U.K.; 
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term bond yield spreads 
during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 
 
-Unconventional monetary policy actions have been successful 
at lessening significant risks of inflation and output downfalls. 
(Driffill, 2015) 
 
EZ, USA, UK Draw out lessons from 
USA and UK 
unconventional monetary 
policies for the Euro zone. 
  -The ECB’s programme had a much smaller effect on bond 
yields and thus the effects on output and inflation could be less 
puissant than in the case of BoE and Fed; 
-Creation of asset prices bubbles, allowing zombies firms and 
banks to survive, higher levels of future inflation and the 
deceleration of the adjustment processes, does not appear to be a 
concern for EA; 
-The ECB’s efforts seemed to make an impact on the reduction 
of costs of debt service that could ease the fiscal situation of 
member states.  
 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011)  
US Assess the effect of QE 
made by Fed on interest 
rates with emphasis on the 
channels and policy’s 
implications 
-Start 2008 – end of third 
quarter 2011; 
-Intraday data window 
Event-study -QE1 and QE2 reduced nominal interest rates on Treasuries, 
agencies, corporate bonds and MBSs; 
-Main transmission channels: signalling effect and “portfolio 
balance channel”. 
(Gagnon et al., 2011) 
 
US Enlighten how LSAP were 
implemented and through 
which transmission 







data from January 1985 
to June 2008 
-Event-study (variations 
of interest rates around 
announcements) 
-Time-series (OLS & 
DOLS): impact of asset 
purchases on the ten-year 
term premium. 
-Lifelong reduction of long-term interest rate in securities even 
in those that were not part of the LASP programme; 
-Reduction made through lower risk premiums and not by lower 
expectations of future short-term interest rates; 




US Assess the impact on 
several long-term interest 
rates of MP shocks during 
the financial crisis 






-Monetary policy shocks affect long-run Treasury and Corporate 
bonds but its effect fades quite fast, around two months; 
-The impact of monetary policy shocks is stronger in longer-
term interest rates than in short-term interest rates. 
(Chung et al., 2010) 
 
USA -Estimate the impact of the 
LSAPs on macroeconomic 
variables such as, inflation, 
GDP level and 
unemployment rate; 
-Incorporate expectations 
into the analysis. 
2009 – 2016 FRB/US Forecast Model -Improvement of real economy condition made through changes 
in financial conditions, such as lower foreign exchange value of 
the dollar and higher stock market valuations; 
-Increase in GDP; 
-Lower unemployment rate; 
-LSAPs contributed to price stability and long-term inflationary 
consequences of the programme are not a likely scenario; 
-The study reflects that agents have confidence in the FOMC’s 
actions. 





Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain 
Discover the determinants 
of the increase in the 
sovereign bond yield 
spread of the selected 
countries vis-à-vis 
Germany in the period 
End-July 2007 – end-
March 2009 
Dynamic panel regression -Announcements of bank rescue packages steered a revision of 
sovereign credit risk by investors; 
-When comparing to Germany, countries with greater expected 
budget deficits or/and greater government debt ratios have 
higher government bond yields spreads.  















-Evaluate changes in 
Eurozone spreads: 
-Outlining how much of 
the downturn is merited to 
improving fundamentals; 
-Determining how much 
could be attributed to 
optimistic market 
sentiments sparked by the 
announcement of OMT in 
Q3 of 2012. 
Q1 2000 – Q3 2013  -Throughout 2010-2012 periphery countries suffered an increase 
in their spread that could not be justified by changes in the 
fundamentals, such as debt-to-GDP ratio, but by negative market 
sentiments; 
-After Q3 2012 the spreads of periphery countries have declined 
and, as before, this occurrence could not be attributed to changes 
in fundamentals but it could be associated with improvement of 
market sentiments, which coincide exactly with the OMT 
announcement by the ECB; 
-Market sentiments are not always in line with the fundamentals 
what could prevent the market from considering the actuals 
risks.  







-What factors have been 
influencing that spread in 
the euro zone after the 
introduction of the Euro, 
focusing on the relation 
between the banking sector 
and sovereign risk; 
-Note: does not access the 
effect of QE. 
January 1999 – February 
2009 
Dynamic Panel Model -The size of the banking sector, proxy by aggregate balance 
sheet to GDP ratio, is an essential factor of sovereign risk spread 
relative to Germany in the euro area; 
-If and when readings of aggregate risk rise, yields increase 
more rapidly in economies with large banking sectors but the 
rising in aggregate risk is in itself increasing banking risk; 
-Thus, variations of global risk perception can affect, in size and 
speed, sovereign risk spreads; 
-Sovereign spreads diminish with the equity ratio. 
 











determinants of EMU 
member states’ 
government yield spreads 
January 2000 – Sep 2010 Dynamic panel regression -Spread converged with the introduction of the Euro and 
abruptly diverged with the financial crisis of 2007; 
-Before the crisis some spreads’ determinants were being 
ignored by the investors, after the crisis investors gave more 
attention to countries’ credit risk; and risk aversion in the 
markets became more important; 
-During the crisis, the fundamentals become more important for 
investors leading to an increase of spreads; 
-Sovereign risk is manipulated by equity ratios of banks; 
-High forecast debt levels have a higher impact on yield spreads 
than expected GDP growth rates. 
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Table II - Variables: United States of America 
Variable EViews Source Database Code Database Name 
Long-term Bond Yield LRYield 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
DGS10 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Instrumental Interest Rate DISCOUNTR 
IMF - International Financial 
Statistics 
INTDSRUSM193N 
Interest Rates, Discount Rate for United States©, Percent per Annum, 
Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Instrumental Interest Rate EFFR 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
FEDFUNDS 
Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Total Asset of Banks BASSETS 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
TLAACBMO27NB
OG 
Total Assets, All Commercial Banks, Billions of U.S. Dollars, Monthly, 
Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDP   




Real Gross Domestic Product, Index Q1 2010=100, Quarterly, 
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate 
GDP GDPR 
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) 
GDPCA Gross Domestic Product, Real, Index 2010=100; Seasonally Adjusted 




Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (US) 
EQTA 
Total Equity to Total Assets for Banks, Percent, Quarterly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Debt/GDP DEBT_GDP 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis 
GFDEGDQ188S 
Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, 
Percent of GDP, Seasonally Adjusted 
VIX VIX 
Chicago Board Options 
Exchange 
VIXCLS 
CBOE Volatility Index: VIX©, Index, Monthly, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
REER 
IMF - International Financial 
Statistics 
USI..RECE US Real Effective FX Rate (REER) Based on Consumer Price Index 
Industrial Production INDPRO 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
INDPRO 
Industrial Production Index, Index 2012=100, Monthly, Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Announcements QE ANN_QE 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013) + 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
Generated   
QE purchases QE_ST/QE_CT 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
  https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo/operations/search.html 
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Table III - Variables: United Kingdom 
Variable EViews Source Database Code Database Name 
Long-term Bond Yield LRYield OECD IRLTLT01GBM156N 
Long-term GOV Bond Yields: 10-year: Main 
(Including Benchmark) for the UK 
Instrumental Interest Rate  BANK_RATE Bank of England BOERUKM Bank of England Policy Rate in the UK 




Government debt (consolidated) (as % of GDP) 
VIX VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange VIXCLS 
CBOE Volatility Index: VIX©, Index, Monthly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Real Effective Exchange Rate REER IMF - International Financial Statistics UKQ..RECE 
UK Real Effective FX Rate (REER) Based on 
Consumer Price Index 
Industrial Production INDPRO Bank of England IPIUKM 
Industrial Production Index in the United Kingdom©, 
Index Jan 2010=100, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted 
Announcements QE ANN_QE 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013) + Bank of 
England 
Generated   
QE purchases AFP Bank of England YWWB9R9 
Quantity of Assets purchased by the creation of central 
bank reserves on a settled basis (in sterling millions) 
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Table IV - Variables: Euro Area 
Variable EViews Source Database Code Database Name 
Long-term Bond Yield LRYIELD ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_
10Y.YLD 
Euro area 10-year Government Benchmark bond 
yield - Yield 
Instrumental Interest Rate MRO ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR
_FR.LEV  
ECB Main refinancing operations - fixed rate 
tenders (fixed rate) (date of changes) - Level 
DEBT/GDP DEBT_GDP EUROSTAT Z8ESBTTXR 
Z8 Government Consolidated Gross Debt: 
GGOVT(% GDP)(ESA2010) 
VIX VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange VIXCLS 
CBOE Volatility Index: VIX©, Index, Monthly, 
Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
REER 
IMF - International Financial 
Statistics 
EMI..RECE 
EM Real Effective FX Rate (REER) Based on 
Consumer Price Index 
Industrial Production INDPRO EUROSTAT 
STS.M.I8.Y.PROD.NS0020.
4.000 
Euro area 19 (fixed composition) - Industrial 
Production Index, Total Industry (excluding 
construction) 
Announcements QE ANN_QE (Fawley and Neely, 2013) + ECB Generated   
QE purchases APP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse EMEAPPTPA 
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Table V - Variables: Japan 
Variable EViews Source Database Code Database Name 
Long-term Bond Yield 
LRYIELD OECD IRLTLT01JPM156N 
Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main 
(Including Benchmark) for Japan©, Percent, 
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Instrumental Interest Rate DISCOUNTR 
IMF - International Financial 
Statistics INTDSRJPM193N 
Interest Rates, Discount Rate for Japan©, Percent per 
Annum, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Debt/GDP DEBT_GDP Datastream JPXGGG%.R 
JP General Government - Debt, Gross (%GDP) 
NADJ 
VIX VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange VIXCLS 
CBOE Volatility Index: VIX©, Index, Monthly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Real Effective Exchange Rate REER 
IMF - International Financial 
Statistics JPI..RECE 
JP Real Effective FX Rate (REER) Based on 
Consumer Price Index 
Industrial Production Index INDPRO OECD JPNPROINDMISMEI 
Production of Total Industry in Japan©, Index 
2010=100, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted 
Announcements QE 
ANN (Fawley and Neely, 2013) + BOJ Generated   
QE purchases 
QE Datastream JPOPRCFLA 
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Table VI - Announcements: United States of America 
Date Programme Event Brief Description Interest Rate News 
2008 
    
25/11/2008 QE1 FOMC statement 
LSAPs announced: Fed will purchase $100 billion in Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) 
debt and $500 billion in MBS.  
01/12/2008 QE1 Bernanke speech First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries. 
 
16/12/2008 QE1 FOMC statement First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries by FOMC. 
The Fed cuts the federal 
funds rate from 1% to 0.00-
0.25%.  
2009 
    
28/01/2009 QE1 FOMC statement Fed stands ready to expand QE and buy Treasuries. 
 
18/03/2009 QE1 FOMC statement 
LSAPs expanded: Fed will purchase $300 billion in long-term Treasuries and 
an additional $750 and $100 billion in MBS and GSE debt, respectively. 
Fed expects low rates for 
"an extended period". 
12/08/2009 QE1 FOMC statement  LSAPs slowed: All purchases will finish by the end of October, not mid-September. 
 
23/09/2009 QE1 FOMC statement LSAPs slowed: Agency debt and MBS purchases will finish at the end of 2010:Q1.  
 
04/11/2009 QE1 FOMC statement LSAPs downsized: Agency debt purchases will finish at $175 billion. 
 
2010 
    
10/08/2010 QE1 FOMC statement Balance sheet maintained: The Fed will reinvest principal payments from LSAPs in Treasuries. 
 
27/08/2010 QE2 Bernanke speech Bernanke suggests role for additional QE “should further action prove necessary.” 
 
21/09/2010 QE2 FOMC statement 
FOMC emphasizes low inflation, which “is likely to remain subdued for some 




FOMC members’ “sense” is that “[additional] accommodation may be appropriate before long.” 
 
15/10/2010 QE2 Bernanke speech Bernanke reiterates that Fed stands ready to further ease policy. 
 
03/11/2010 QE2 FOMC statement QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries. 
 
2011 
    
22/06/2011 QE2 FOMC statement 
QE2 finishes: Treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of month, as scheduled; principal 
payments will continue to be reinvested.  








Maturity Extension Program (“Operation Twist”) announced: The Fed will purchase $400 billion 
of Treasuries with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 years and sell an equal amount with remaining 
maturities of 3 years or less; MBS and agency debt principal payments will no longer be reinvested 
in Treasuries, but instead in MBS. 
 
2012 






Maturity Extension Program extended: The Fed will continue to purchase long-term securities and 
sell short-term securities through the end of 2012. Purchases/sales will continue at the current pace, 





FOMC members “judged that additional monetary accommodation would likely be warranted 
fairly soon...”  
13/09/2012 QE3 FOMC statement 
QE3 announced: The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month as long 
as “the outlook for the labour market does not improve substantially...in the 
context of price stability.” 
Fed expects low rates “at 
least through mid-2015.”  
12/12/2012 QE3 FOMC statement 
QE3 expanded: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion of long-term Treasuries per month 
but will no longer sterilize purchases through the sale 
of short-term Treasuries. 
The Fed expects low rates 
to be appropriate while 
unemployment is above 6.5 
percent and inflation is 
forecasted below 2.5 
percent.  
2013 




Beginning in January of 2014, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $40 
billion per month and the purchase of MBS to $35 billion per month. 
The Committee decided to 
keep the target range for the 
federal funds rate at 0 to 
1/4 percent. 
2014 




Beginning in February, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $35 billion 




Beginning in April, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $30 billion per 




Beginning in May, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $25 billion per 




Beginning in July, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $20 billion per 




Beginning in August, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $15 billion per 
month and the purchase of MBS to $10 billion per month.   






Beginning in October, the Fed will decrease the purchase of long-term Treasuries to $10 billion per 




The FOMC discussed ways to normalize the stance of monetary policy and the Federal Reserve's 




QE finishes: purchases will wrap up at the end of month, as scheduled; The Committee is 
maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt 
and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over 
maturing Treasury securities at auction. 
 
2015 
    
16/12/2015 
   
The Committee decided to 
raise the target range for the 
EFFR to 1/4 to 1/2 percent; 
increase the discount rate at 
the Banks from 3/4 percent 
to 1 percent. 
2017 
    
15/03/2017 
   
The Federal Reserve Board 
has approved the increase 
of the discount rate at the 
Banks from 1-1/4 percent 
to 1-1/2 percent. 
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Table VII - Announcements: United Kingdom 
Date Programme Event Brief description Interest rate news 
2009 




APF established: The BOE will purchase up to £50 billion of “high quality private sector 




The BOE views a slight downside risk to meeting the inflation target, reiterates APF as a 
potential policy instrument.   
05/03/2009 APF MPC statement 
QE announced: The BOE will purchase up to £75 billion in assets, now financed by reserve 
issuance; medium- and long-term gilts will comprise the “majority” of new purchases.  
The BOE cuts policy rate from 
1% to 0.5%.  
07/05/2009 APF MPC statement QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £125 billion in assets.  
 
06/08/2009 APF MPC statement 
QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £175 billion in assets; to accommodate the 
increased size, the BOE will expand purchases into gilts with remaining maturity of 3 years 
or more.  
 
05/11/2009 APF MPC statement QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £200 billion in assets.  
 
2010 
    
04/02/2010 APF MPC statement 
QE maintained: The BOE maintains the stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of 




    
06/10/2011 APF MPC statement 
QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £275 billion in assets financed by reserve 




Maximum private asset purchases reduced: HM Treasury lowers the ceiling on APF private 
asset holdings from £50 billion to £10 billion.  
2012 
    
09/02/2012 APF MPC statement QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £325 billion in assets. 
 
05/07/2012 APF MPC statement QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £375 billion in assets. 
 
2013 
    
24/09/2013 
 
Speech by David 
Miles 
David Miles states: "people should not expect monetary policy to quickly return to normal". 
 
2016 
    
03/08/2016 
  
QE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to £435 billion in assets. 
The BOE reduced the official 
Bank Rate to 0.25%. 
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Table VIII - Announcements: Euro Area 
Date Programme Event Brief Description Interest rate news 
2014     
02/10/2014 ABSPP/CBPP3 Governing 
Council press 
release 
ABSPP explained: ECB announces operational details of asset-backed securities; the list of 
assets eligible as collateral will be expanded, with case-to-case specific rules in order to 
enhance the whole euro-area; CBPP3 is announced.  
LTRO early payments suspended: ECB suspends early-repayments of the 3-year LTROs 
during the year-end period due to the expected low interest and the concentration of other 
operations. 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility will remain 
unchanged at 0.05%, 0.30% and -
0.20% respectively. 
2015     
22/01/2015 QE; PSPP Governing 
Council press 
release 
ECB expands purchases to include bonds issued by euro area central governments, 
agencies and European institutions; PSPP: purchase sovereign bonds from EA 
Governments and debt securities from European institutions and national agencies 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility will remain 
unchanged at 0.05%, 0.30% and -
0.20% respectively. 
22/01/2015 TLTRO Governing 
Council press 
release 
TLTRO's interest rate altered:  The interest rate on the TLTROs will be fixed over the life 
of each operation at the rate on the MROs prevailing at the time of take-up. 
 
03/12/2015 PSPP Governing 
Council press 
release 
PSPP expanded: will last at least until March 2017, instead of September 2016; list of 
eligible assets for purchase expanded: regional and local Government bonds. 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility will 
remain unchanged at 0.05% and 
0.30% respectively and the deposit 
facility will decreased by 10 basis 
points to -0.30%. 
2016     
10/03/2016 APP (ABSPP, 
PSPP, CSPP) 
TLTRO II 
 APP expanded: combined monthly purchases will amount to €80 billion starting in April; 
Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) announced: purchase of investment grade 
euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations established in the euro area; 
TLTRO II: new series of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations will be launched 
in June. 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations will decreased by 5 basis 
points to 0.00%, the interest rates 
on the marginal lending facility will 
decreased by 5 basis points to 
0.25% and the deposit facility will 
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decreased by 10 basis points to -
0.40%. 
21/04/2016 CSPP  CSPP explained: Outright purchases of investment-grade euro-denominated bonds issued 
by non-bank corporations established in the euro area will be carried out by six 
Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs). 
 
03/05/2016 TLTRO II  TLTRO II: legal acts released. The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility will remain 
unchanged. 
02/06/2016 CSPP, PSPP  CSPP and PSPP explained: Governing Council clarifies what is an eligible issuer;  
CSPP will start on the 8th of June. 
 
03/11/2016 ABSPP  ABSPP explained: Only ABS for which loan-level data submissions have been made to 
“designated” repositories may be considered for compliance with the Eurosystem’s ABS 
loan-level requirements. 
 
08/12/2016 APP  APP diminished: the net asset purchases are intended to be €60 billion from April 2017 to 
December 2017 or beyond. APP modified: Purchases of securities with a yield to maturity 
below the interest rate on the ECB’s deposit facility will be permitted to the extent 
necessary. 
PSPP modified: Eurosystem central banks will have the possibility to also accept cash as 
collateral in their PSPP securities lending (SL) facilities without having to reinvest it in a 
cash-neutral manner; The maturity range will be broadened by decreasing the minimum 
remaining maturity for eligible securities from two years to one year. 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility will remain 
unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and -
0.40% respectively. 
15/12/2016 ABSPP  ABSPP modified: the programme should be fully implemented by national central banks 
rather than relying on the support from external managers from April 2017.  
 
2017     
19/01/2017 APP (PSPP, 
CBPP3, 
ABSPP, CSPP) 
 APP diminished: the net asset purchases are intended to be €60 billion from April 2017 to 
December 2017 or beyond; No purchases below the deposit facility rate (DFR) will be 
conducted under the CBPP3, the ABSPP or the CSPP; Purchases of assets with yields 
below the DFR will only occur under the PSPP but priority will be given to assets with 
yields above the DFR. 
The ECB decided that the interest 
rate on the main refinancing 
operations and the interest rates on 
the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility will remain 
unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and -
0.40% respectively. 
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Table IX - Announcements: Japan  
Date Programme Event Brief Description Interest rate news 
2008     




Special-Funds-Supplying Operations announced: The BOJ will operate a facility through the end of 
April to lend an unlimited amount to banks at the uncollateralized overnight call rate (0,3%) and 
collateralized by corporate debt.  
 





Outright purchases expanded: The BOJ increases monthly JGB purchases (last increased October 2002) 
from ¥1.2 trillion to ¥1.4 trillion; Corporate Financial Instruments: they will also look into purchasing 
commercial paper.  
The BOJ lowers the 
target for the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate from 0.3% to 
0.1%.  
2009     





Outright purchases announced: The BOJ will purchase up to ¥3 trillion in commercial paper and ABCP 
and is investigating outright purchases of corporate bonds.  
 





Outright purchases expanded: The BOJ will extend commercial paper purchases and the SFSOs through 
the end of September (previously end of March) and will purchase up to ¥1 trillion in corporate bonds.  
 





Outright purchases expanded: The BOJ increases monthly JGB purchases from ¥1.4 trillion to ¥1.8 
trillion.  
 





Programs extended: The BOJ extends the SFSOs and outright purchases of corporate paper and bonds 
through the end of the year.  
 





Status of programs: Outright purchases of corporate finance instruments will expire at the end of 2009 as 
expected, but the SFSOs will be extended through 2010:Q1; ample liquidity provision past 2010:Q1 will 
occur through funds- supplying operations against pooled collateral, which will accept a larger range of 
collateral.  
 
01/12/2009 FROs  Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
Fixed-Rate Operations: The BOJ will offer ¥10 trillion in 3-month loans against the full menu of eligible 
collateral at the uncollateralized overnight call rate.  
 
2010     
17/03/2010 FROs  Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
Facility expansion: The BOJ expands the size of the FROs to ¥20 trillion.   
21/05/2010 GSFF  Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
GSFF announcement: The BOJ will offer ¥3 trillion in 1-year loans to private financial institutions with 
project proposals for “strengthening the foundations for economic growth.”  
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Facility expansion: The BOJ adds ¥10 trillion in 6-month loans to the FROs.   
05/10/2010 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP established: The will purchase ¥5 trillion in assets (¥3.5 trillion in JGBs and Treasury discount 
bills, ¥1 trillion in commercial paper and corporate bonds, and ¥0.5 trillion in ETFs and J-REITs).  
The BOJ sets the target 
for the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate at 
around 0 to 0.1%.  
2011     
14/03/2011 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in assets (¥0.5 trillion in JGBs, ¥1 
trillion in Treasury discount bills, ¥1.5 trillion in commercial paper, ¥1.5 trillion in corporate bonds, 
¥0.45 trillion in ETFs, and ¥0.05 trillion in J-REITs).  
 
14/06/2011 GSFF  Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
GSFF expanded: The BOJ makes available another ¥0.5 trillion in loans to private financial institutions 
for the purpose of investing in equity and extending asset-based loans.  
 
04/08/2011 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP/FROs expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in assets (¥2 trillion in JGBs, ¥1.5 
trillion in Treasury discount bills, ¥0.1 trillion in commercial paper, ¥0.9 trillion in corporate bonds, ¥0.5 
trillion in ETFs, and ¥0.01 trillion in J-REITs); 6-month collateralized loans through the FROs are 
expanded by ¥5 trillion.  
 
27/10/2011 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in JGBs.   
2012     
14/02/2012 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥10 trillion in JGBs.   
13/03/2012 GSFF  Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
GSFF expanded: The BOJ makes available another ¥2 trillion in loans to private financial institutions, 
including ¥1 trillion in U.S.-dollar-denominated loans and ¥0.5 trillion in smaller-sized (¥1 million-¥10 
million) loans.  
 
27/04/2012 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded/FROs reduced: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥10 trillion in JGBs, ¥0.2 trillion in 
ETFs, and ¥0.01 in J-REITs. The BOJ also reduces the availability of 6-month FRO loans by ¥5 trillion.  
 
12/07/2012 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded/FROs reduced: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in Treasury discount bills 
and reduces the availability of FRO loans by ¥5 trillion.  
 
19/09/2012 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in JGBs and ¥5 trillion in Treasury 
discount bills.  
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30/10/2012 CME/SBLF Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded/SBLF announced: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion in JGBs, ¥5 trillion in 
Treasury discount bills, ¥0.1 trillion in commercial paper, ¥0.3 trillion in corporate bonds, ¥0.5 trillion in 
ETFs, and ¥0.01 trillion in J-REITs. Through the SBLF it will fund up to 100 percent of depository 
institutions’ net increase in lending to the nonfinancial sector.  
 
20/12/2012 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥5 trillion JGBs and ¥5 trillion in Treasury discount 
bills.  
 
2013     
22/01/2013 CME Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
APP expanded: The BOJ will purchase an additional ¥2 trillion JGBs. The Bank decided to introduce a 
"Price Stability Target". 
 
04/04/2013 QQE/CME/SLF Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
Introduction of the "Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing" . The monetary base will increase at 
an annual pace of about ¥60-70 trillion. JGBs with all maturities including 40-year bonds will be made 
eligible for purchase, and the average remaining maturity of the Bank's JGB purchases will be extended. 
The purchase JGBs will increase at an annual pace of about ¥50 trillion. The purchase of ETFs and J-
REITs will increase at an annual pace of ¥1 trillion and ¥30 billion respectively. APP will finish. 
Temporary suspension of the "banknote principle". SLF will be relaxed for the time being. 
 
2014     
18/02/2014 SBL/GSFF Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
SBL announced: financial institutions will be able to borrow funds from the Bank up to an amount that is 
twice as much as the net increase in their lending. GSFF announced: the maximum amount of the Bank's 
fund-provisioning under the main rules will be ¥7 trillion and financial institutions will be able to borrow 
funds at a fixed rate of 0.1 percent per annum for 4 years instead of 1-3 years at present. 
 
31/10/2014 QQE Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
QQE expanded: The BOJ will increase the purchases in order to reach a annual pace of about:  ¥80 
trillion in JGBs, ¥3 trillion in ETFs and ¥90 billion in J-REITs. The BOJ will increase the average 
maturity of JGB to 7-10 years. ETFs that track the JPX-Nikkei Index 400 will be eligible for purchase. 
The Monetary Base will increase at an annual pace of about ¥80 trillion.  
 
2015     
21/01/2015 SBL/GSFF Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
GSFF and SBF extended for 1 more year. GSFF/SBF new framework: enabling financial institutions, 
which do not have a current account at the Bank, to use these facilities through their central 
organizations. GSFF expanded: increase of the maximum amount of funds that the Bank can provide to 
each financial institution to ¥2 trillion; the increase of the maximum amount outstanding of its fund-
provisioning as a whole to ¥10 trillion. 
 
18/12/2015 QQE Statement 
on monetary 
policy  
QQE expanded: new program for purchasing ETFs at an annual pace of about ¥300 billion, in addition to 
the current program of ETF; Expanding eligible collateral for the Bank's provision of credit; Extending 
the average remaining maturity of JGB purchases to 7-12 years; The maximum amount of each issue of 
J-REIT to be purchased shall be increased from the current 5 percent to 10 percent of the total amount of 
that J-REIT issued. 
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Table X - Results: United States of America  
 
1M 2M 3M 4M   1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
Variables 
1999 M04 - 2007 
M12 
2008 M01 - 
2015M12 
2008 M01 - 2015 
M12 
1999 M03 - 2015 
M12   1999 Q3 - 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2015 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2015 Q4 1999 Q3 - 2015 Q4 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE   Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
                                    




  -0.088*** 0.024   -0.449*** 0.135 -0.159** 0.071 
 
  -0.204*** 0.044 
VDiscountR 
 










      








      












      






    
 
  0.060*** 0.017 
 
  0.043*** 0.009 
VABAY 
 
  -0.034** 0.014 
 






      










  -0.268** 0.101 






































      












      




  -0.012 0.003   -0.021** 0.009 -0.034*** 0.008 
 
  -0.034*** 0.005 




    -4.731* 2.533 -7.369*** 2.031 
 
  -5.194*** 1.307 
INDPRO 0.055*** 0.018     
 




      
VGR_INDPRO 
 
  8.327** 3.164 
 
  4.202* 2.512   11.330** 5.265 5.624632** 2.373 
 





  -0.096* 0.053 -0.049* 0.030   
 









    
 






















    
 
  
   
      
Constant -11.023 3.256 3.305 0.898 -0.048 0.034 2.561 0.595   535.841 286.123 838.134 230.872 -0.084 0.086 594.078 148.389 
R2 / DW stat 0.332 1.981 0.428 1.933 0.086 1.741 0.230 1.827   0.627 2.020 0.748 2.022 0.416 1.285 0.624 2.000 
No. Of observations 105.000   96.000   96.000   202.000     34.000   32.000   32.000   66.000   
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
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Table XI - Results: United Kingdom  
 
1M 2M 3M 4M   1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
Variables 
2000 M03 - 2007 M12 2008 M01 - 2016M05 2008 M01 - 2015 M12 2000 M03 - 2016 M04   2000 Q2 - 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2016 Q1 2008 Q1 - 2017 Q1 2000 Q2 - 2016 Q2 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE   Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
LRYield(-1)             -0.085*** 0.026       -0.246** 0.106         
LRYield(-2)                   -0.244* 0.126         -0.233*** 0.071 
VLRYield(-1) 0.219*** 0.074 0.284*** 0.102                           
VLRYield(-2)     -0.176* 0.094                           
VBankRate(-1) -0.317*** 0.099               -0.487*** 0.126         -0.173* 0.088 
VBankRate(-2)     -0.234*** 0.089               -0.232* 0.118         
VDebt/GDP                   0.127** 0.057         0.031 0.032 
VDebt/GDP(-1) 0.067 0.053         0.040 0.034                   
VDebt/GDP(-2)     0.028 0.024                           
VIX -0.006** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.004     -0.010* 0.002   -0.011 0.008 -0.032*** 0.007     -0.017*** 0.005 
REER                   0.008 0.014             
INDPRO             0.011* 0.006   0.080*** 0.025         0.028 0.022 
VGR_INDPRO -1.329 1.249               -7.808*** 2.490 -3.236 3.578     2.784 1.368 
VGR_INDPRO(-1)             -0.587 0.548                   
VGR_INDPRO(-2)     1.520 1.096                           
ANN_QE         -0.009 0.049               -0.019 0.198     
ANN_QE(-1)         0.009 0.044           0.221** 0.102 0.309*** 0.091 0.110 0.068 
ANN_QE(-2)         0.014 0.050                       
ANN_QE(-3)     0.052 0.046 0.070 0.063                       
AFP         0.000 0.000           -1.91E-06** 0.000 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.000 
AFP(-1)         1.58E-07* 0.000           1.32E-06* 0.000 0.000 0.000     
AFP(-2)     -6.61E-08* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.04E-07** 0.000                   
AFP(-3)         -1.75E-07* 0.000                       
Constant 0.099 0.049 0.281 0.115 -0.094 0.072 -0.137 0.542   -8.490 3.468 1.953 0.604 -0.259 0.129 -1.635 2.429 
R2 / DW stat 0.204 1.992 0.345 1.961 0.074 1.319 0.188 1.496   0.511 1.968 0.552 1.991 0.138 1.740 0.422 1.970 
No. of observations 94.000   101.000   111.000   194.000     31.000   33.000   37.000   65.000   
 
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table XII - Results: Euro Area  
 
1M 2M 3M 4M   1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
Variables 
2000 M02 - 2007 M12 2008 M01 - 2016M12 2008 M01 - 2017 M02 1999 M04 - 2017 M01   2000 Q2 - 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2016 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2017 Q1 2000 Q3 - 2016 Q4 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE   Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
LRYield(-3) -0.063 0.039                               
VLRYield(-1) 0.096 0.075 0.072 0.075     0.140** 0.060   -0.013 0.135 0.213* 0.112     0.250*** 0.091 
VLRYield(-2) -0.164* 0.088               -0.049 0.151             
MRO                               0.040 0.026 
MRO(-3)                   0.235* 0.135             
VMRO -0.208** 0.087         0.011 0.008                   
VMRO(-1)     -0.148 0.176               0.357* 0.197         
Debt/GDP(-1)                   -0.077** 0.038             
VDebt/GDP                               0.084** 0.037 
GR_Debt/GDP 4.936 3.095                   12.299** 5.514         
GR_Debt/GDP(-2)     11.138 6.780                           
VIX -0.004 0.003 -0.007** 0.003     -0.002 0.002   -0.028*** 0.007 -0.021*** 0.007     -0.013*** 0.004 
REER -0.027* 0.012 0.007* 0.004           -0.019*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.009         
REER(-1) 0.019 0.012                               
INDPRO 0.008* 0.004                               
GR_INDPRO             1.527 1.341   14.399** 5.620             
VGR_INDPRO     1.405 1.102                           
VGR_INDPRO(-1)                       -2.706 2.014         
ANN_QE                           -0.224 0.291     
ANN_QE(-1)     -0.096** 0.040               -0.252 0.300 -0.092 0.186     
ANN_QE(-2)     -0.151*** 0.056 -0.095 0.074 -0.141* 0.077           -0.039 0.225 0.299*** 0.100 
ANN_QE(-3)         -0.058 0.063                   -0.224 0.148 
APP                       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
APP(-1)     
3.13E-
06*** 0.000                   0.000 0.000     
APP(-2)         5.67E-06** 0.000 7.38E-06*** 0.000           0.000 0.000     
APP(-4)         -4.16E-06* 0.000 -6.34E-06*** 0.000               -1.47E-06** 0.000 
APP(-6)                               4.09E-06*** 0.000 
Constant 0.369 0.485 -0.616 0.406 -0.039 0.026 -0.008 0.050   6.664 2.998 -2.636 0.872 -0.100 0.079 0.075 0.124 
R2 / DW stat 0.252 1.978 0.152 2.013 0.056 1.740 0.094 1.980   0.539 1.872 0.331 1.996 0.045 1.533 0.239 1.995 
No. of observations 95.000 108.000 110.000 214.000   31.000 36.000 37.000 66.000 
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
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Table XIII - Results: Japan  
 
1M 2M 3M 4M   1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
Variables 1999 M05 - 2007 M12 2008 M01 - 2015M12 2008 M01 - 2015 M12 1999 M06 - 2015 M12   2000 Q2 - 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2015 Q4 2008 Q1 - 2015 Q4 
1999 Q4 - 2015 
Q4 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE   Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
LRYield(-1) -0.012 0.091 -0.130 -1.225           -0.281 0.256 -0.956*** 0.205         
LRYield(-2) -0.166 0.107 -0.045 0.102           -0.073 0.196             
LRYield(-3)                       0.178* 0.088         
VLRYield(-1)             0.040 0.104               -0.047 0.097 
VLRYield(-2)             -0.186*** 0.064               -0.167** 0.077 
VLRYield(-4)             -0.145** 0.060                   
VDiscountR(-1)                       0.492* 0.278         
VDiscountR(-2)     0.818*** 0.231                       -0.367** 0.171 
VDiscountR(-3) 0.318*** 0.112 0.257 0.223                           
Debt/GDP                       -0.015*** 0.004         
VDebt/GDP     -0.898** 0.389                           
VDebt/GDP(-1) -0.443** 0.186         -0.068 0.055       0.051*** 0.018         
VDebt/GDP(-2)                               -0.024 0.015 
Vdebt/GDP(-4)                   -0.075 0.058             
GR_Debt/GDP     177.937** 74.585                           
GR_Debt/GDP(-1) 67.421*** 23.919         15.874* 9.070                   
VIX -0.007*** 0.002 -0.004** 0.002     -0.003*** 0.001   -0.012** 0.005 -0.003 0.002     -0.005* 0.003 
REER     0.003** 0.001           0.007 0.005             
REER(-3)                       0.003** 0.002         
INDPRO(-1)                               -0.003 0.004 
INDPRO(-3)                       -0.003** 0.001         
GR_INDPRO                       -0.690 0.541         
GR_INDPRO(-1)             -0.210 0.215                   
VGR_INDPRO                   3.453* 1.779             
ANN     0.025 0.017 0.023 0.017           -0.094*** 0.028 -0.081* 0.045 -0.018 0.036 
ANN(-1)         0.004 0.027               0.096** 0.037     
ANN(-2)         0.000 0.025                       
ANN(-3)         0.035 0.022                       
QE         0.000 0.000               0.000 0.000 
-3.35E-
07* 0.000 
QE(-1)         7.98E-07*** 0.000 0.000 0.000       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
QE(-2)     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000                       
QE(-3)         0.000                         
QE(-5)             -5.16E-07**                     
Constant 0.376 0.102 -0.098 0.098 -0.042 0.017 0.049 0.023   0.147 0.397 3.648 0.922 -0.051 0.039 0.447 0.420 
R2 / DW stat 0.209 2.100 0.165 2.008 0.068 2.026 0.103 1.936   0.447 2.023 0.683 1.994 0.267 2.484 0.164 2.018 
No. of observations 104.000   96.000   96.000   199.000     31.000   32.000   32.000   65.000   
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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